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PROPOSED LEGISLATION
PRODUCTS LIABILITY TORT REFORM: WHY VIRGINIA
SHOULD ADOPT THE HENDERSON-TWERSKI PROPOSED
REVISION OF SECTION 402A, RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS
Peter Nash Swisher*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past three decades, literally thousands of American
products liability judicial opinions have explicitly referred to, and
analyzed, section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts.1 At
least thirty-four states have judicially adopted section 402A,2 and
five other states have passed specific statutes adopting the section. 3
Since the landmark products liability case of Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc.4 in 1963, at least forty-five states have now
adopted some form of strict liability in tort remedy in American
products liability actions.5 Only Virginia and four other states do
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond, T.C. Williams School of Law; B.A., 1966,
Amherst College; M.A., 1967, Stanford University; J.D., 1973, University of California, Has-
tings College of Law.
The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Carter Redd, J.D., 1992,
University of Richmond, T.C. Williams School of Law, in the preparation of Part III of this
article.
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964).
2. For a comprehensive listing of such state law, see generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROD-
UcTs LiABmiTy 3D § 16:9 (Timothy E. Travers et al. eds. 1987); Richard W. Bieman, Strict
Products Liability: An Overview of State Law, 10 J. PROD. LIAB. 111 (1987).
3. See Aim. CODE ANN. § 4-86-102 (Michie 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-3 (Burns
1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 221 (West 1980); O& REV. STAT. § 30.920 (1988); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (Law. Co-op. 1977).
4. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
5. See, e.g., Bieman, supra note 2.
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not recognize a strict liability in tort remedy applied to state prod-
ucts liability actions.'
Over the past thirty years, however, American products liability
law has reached a surprising, and increasingly more balanced, na-
tional consensus on how the vast majority of states now interpret
and apply strict liability in tort remedies to products liability
cases.7 Indeed, if the American products liability trend in the 1970s
and the early 1980s was to compensate and to protect the con-
sumer, perhaps excessively, then the trend in the 1990s is to recog-
nize and to equalize the rights of the manufacturer and retailer
with those rights of the consumer, through a more balanced judi-
cial and legislative application of state products liability tort re-
form." It is this "quiet revolution" in American products liability
law that Virginia can readily agree with, and adopt.
Accordingly, the time now has come for Virginia to leave behind
its nineteenth century products liability tort law, and adopt the
modern consensus view. Such a legislative action will serve the
Commonwealth well into the twenty-first century.
The purpose of this Article, therefore, is fourfold: first, to illus-
trate that there is currently a newer, more balanced consensus view
in American products liability law today; second, to demonstrate
that this current, realistically balanced, consensus in American
products liability law is persuasively codified in a proposed revi-
sion to section 402A, Restatement (Second) of Torts, by Professors
James Henderson and Aaron Twerski; third, to compare and con-
trast current Virginia products liability law with the Henderson-
Twerski proposed revision of section 402A; fourth, to propose new
legislation in Virginia that would incorporate the Henderson-Twer-
ski proposal, and would realistically reform existing Virginia prod-
6. Delaware, Massachusetts, and Michigan have rejected a strict liability in tort action,
but recognize an implied breach of warranty remedy that cannot be easily disclaimed by the
seller. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-316A (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992) (forbidding
warranty disclaimers in consumer transactions). Apparently only Virginia and North Caro-
lina have not yet recognized a true strict liability remedy in either tort or contract. See
generally 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODucrs LIABILITY 3D, supra note 2, §§ 16:21-:22 (1987); and
1 Louis R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILrrY §§ 1.05-.06 (perm. ed. rev.
vol. 1992).
7. See infra notes 9-37 and accompanying text. See also James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theo-
dore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal
Change, 37 UCLA L. REv. 479 (1990). See generally FRuMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 6;
TRAvRs, supra note 2.
8. See, e.g., Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 7. Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Hen-
derson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REv. 731 (1992).
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ucts liability law to objectively and fairly meet the current and fu-
ture needs of the Virginia consumer, the Virginia manufacturer,
and the Virginia retailer into the twenty-first century.
II. AMERICAN PRODUCTS LIABILITY: A SURPRISING NEW
CONSENSUS
For the past half century, an overwhelming majority of Ameri-
can commentators and courts have recognized that traditional neg-
ligence actions and breach of warranty actions are often inade-
quate remedies for the consumer in products liability cases.9
Negligence actions often involve insurmountable problems of proof
for the consumer, as a negligence action traditionally is based upon
the seller's conduct, rather than being based upon the defective
condition of the product itself.10 Additionally, negligence defenses
such as contributory negligence may completely bar any recovery
by the consumer."
Breach of warranty actions under the Uniform Commercial
Code, on the other hand, are properly based upon the fitness of a
product, rather than on the conduct of the seller,1 2 and contribu-
tory negligence defenses are not recognized in most breach of war-
ranty actions.13 However, a breach of warranty action is not always
an adequate remedy in products liability cases since warranties are
9. Products liability law generally encompasses liability arising from personal injury or
property damage caused by defective products sold in the marketplace, and includes claims
against any party in the marketing chain of distribution from the manufacturer to the re-
tailer. See generally FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 6; AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIA-
BILITY 3D supra note 2; GARY G. SPAHN & ROBERT E. DRAiM, VIRGINIA LAW OF PRODUCTS
LiABiLrrY (1990).
10. See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974); Feldman v. Led-
erie Lab., 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3027 (1992); see also 1 AMERICAN
LAw OF PRODUCTS LIABiTY 3D, supra note 2, § 10:1; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABIL-
rry 3D, supra note 2, § 16:30.
11. See, 1 FRUmER & FRIEDmAN, supra note 6, § 1.04; See also SPAHN & DRAIM, supra
note 9, §§ 6-3, 8-3; James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping with the Time Dimensions in Products
Liability, 69 CAL. L. REV. 919 (1981):
In general, strict liability is thought to be preferable to negligence because it better
enhances social utility by reducing the costs associated with accidents and because it
promotes fairness. Strict liability is believed to increase utility by satisfying four ma-
jor objectives: encouraging investment in product safety, discouraging consumption of
hazardous products, reducing transaction costs, and promoting loss spreading.
Id. at 931-32 (footnotes omitted).
12. See U.C.C. §§ 2-313 to -315 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.2-313 to -315 (Repl. Vol.
1991).
13. See, e.g., Jones v. Meat Packers Equip. Co., 723 F.2d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 1983); Mat-
thews v. Ford Motor Co., 479 F.2d 399, 401 n.1 (4th Cir. 1973).
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often limited14 or totally disclaimed 5 by the seller under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, and additional notice and privity require-
ments are placed upon the consumer. 6
Indeed, there have been numerous commentators who have ar-
gued that the primary purpose of the Uniform Commercial Code is
to regulate transactions within the business community, and not to
regulate products liability disputes. 17
Accordingly, since the landmark case of Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc.i s in 1963, forty-five states have adopted a
strict liability in tort remedy in products liability actions.19 The
purpose of a strict liability tort remedy in such actions was "to
insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products
are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the
market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to
protect themselves. Sales warranties serve this purpose fitfully at
best."20
14. See U.C.C. § 2-719 (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-719 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
15. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-316; (1987) VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-316 (Repl. Vol. 1991); see also
Rothschild, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Does It Balance Warrantor and Consumer
Interests?, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 335, 343-44 (1976) ("The disclaimer section of the U.C.C.
is the most controversial and ambiguous warranty section .... This provision has enabled
merchants to continue shifting the risk of loss back to consumers while camouflaging their
action with legal jargon.").
16. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-607 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-607 (Repl. Vol. 1991) (discussing
notice requirements). Traditional privity requirements between buyer and seller, however,
are no longer as important as they once were. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-318 (1958); VA. CODE
ANN. § 2-318 (Repl. Vol. 1991). See generally FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, §§ 1.05-
.06; and 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PRODucTs LIABIrrY 3D, supra note 2, § 16:32, :36-:39.
17. See, e.g., Marc A. Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers
in Defective Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974 (1966); William L. Prosser, The Fall of the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966); John W. Wade,
Tort Liability for Products Causing Physical Injury and Article 2 of the U.C.C., 48 Mo. L.
REV. 1 (1983). Indeed, some recent recommendations have been to revise the Uniform Com-
mercial Code so that it will have a more limited application to personal injury actions. See,
Fairfax Leary, Jr. & David Frisch, Is Revision Due for Article 2?. 31 VmL. L. REv. 399 (1986);
Speidel, Committee Studies Revising U.C.C. Article 2, 8 Bus. LAW. UPDATE 3 (1988) (sug-
gesting that a personally injured or property damaged buyer who proceeds under Article 2
should be subject to the same Article 2 limitations as a buyer who is asserting a claim for
economic loss).
18. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
19. See generally Bieman, supra note 2, at 111 n.1.
20. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., 377 P.2d at 901 (citing William L. Prosser, The As-
sault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1124-34
(1960)).
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More recently, the courts and legal commentators have advanced
five public policy justifications for adopting a strict liability tort
remedy in products liability actions.
The first public policy justification is compensation and loss
spreading. Losses inevitably result from the use of complex mod-
ern products, and because these losses can have a devastating ef-
fect on the individual consumer, it is humane and fair to shift
these losses to all consumers of the product. This can be done by
imposing strict liability on manufacturers, and forcing them to
raise prices enough to pay for the losses or insure against them.2
Deterrence is the second public policy justification advanced.
Tort liability increases product costs, but business competition in-
duces manufacturers to minimize costs. Imposing liability on man-
ufacturers, therefore, provides them with an incentive to market
safer products. Also, strict tort liability may create more deter-
rence than negligence-based liability since negligence imposes lia-
bility only if the defendant fails to take measures that a reasonable
person would take. Strict liability, in contrast, induces the defend-
ant to go beyond this if the cost of the added safety measures is
less than the potential cost of liability for failing to take them.22
Balancing the needs of consumers and manufacturers also justi-
fies a strict liability tort remedy in product liability actions. Al-
though compensation and deterrence are the most commonly cited
bases for strict tort liability, no court has required manufacturers
to pay for all harm caused by their products. To do so would place
an unreasonable burden on manufacturers and discourage them
from producing useful products. Therefore, over-deterrence is
avoided by balancing the needs of the product manufacturer
against the needs of the consumer.2 3
The fourth public policy justification concerns problems of
proof. Quite often, a manufacturer of a defective product is negli-
gent. However, complexities of modern products technology often
make it extremely difficult for the consumer to establish negli-
gence, because the consumer is at a disadvantage as the manufac-
21. See Alden D. Holford, The Limits of Strict Liability for Product Design and Manu-
facture, 52 TF. L. REv. 81, 82-84, 87-88 (1973); John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict
Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L. J. 825, 826 (1973).
22. Wade, supra note 17. Holford, supra note 21.
23. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for a Middle Ground, 56
N.C. L. REv. 643 (1978); David A. Fischer, Products Liability - An Analysis of Market
Share Liability, 34 VAmD. L. REV. 1623, 1628-29 (1981).
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turer has greater access to expertise, information, and resources.
Imposing strict liability in tort based upon the defective condition
of the product, rather than trying to ascertain the negligent con-
duct of the defendant, relieves the consumer of this very difficult
burden of proving the manufacturer's fault.24 However, the con-
sumer still must demonstrate that the product was in fact defec-
tive, that it was the actual and proximate cause of the injury or
damage, and that there was no comparative fault, assumption of
risk, or unforeseeable product misuse on the part of the consumer.
Likewise, problems of proof with warranty disclaimers or limita-
tions are avoided with a strict tort liability remedy.
Protection of consumer expectation is the final public policy jus-
tification advanced. Consumers should be protected from un-
known, latent dangers in products. This is particularly true since
modern advertising and marketing techniques induce American
consumers to rely on product manufacturers to provide them with
safe, high quality products.2
The overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions have been
persuaded by these interrelated public policy arguments support-
ing strict liability in tort and have adopted strict tort liability in
products liability actions.26 Of the forty-five states adopting such a
strict tort liability remedy, thirty-nine states have adopted, in
whole or in part, section 402A of the Second Restatement of
Torts.
24. See, e.g., Page Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 30, 34 (1973); Gary T. Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability 67 CA.
L. REv. 435, 459-61 (1979).
25. See, e.g., Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection:
Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109
(1974).
26. See, e.g., Richard W. Bieman, Strict Products Liability: An Overview of State Law,
10 J. PROD. LIAB. 111 (1987).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides in part that:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller . ..
Copyright 1965 by the American Law Institute. Reprinted with the permission of the
American Law Institute.
[Vol. 27:857
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A basic, glaring weakness of section 402A, however, is the now
acknowledged fact that the authors of section 402A primarily fo-
cused on those problems relating to defective manufacture and
generally did not focus on two other crucial areas of products lia-
bility law: defective design and defective warnings.2 8 Consequently,
American courts and legislatures grappled for over a quarter cen-
tury with the crucial issue of whether defectively designed prod-
ucts, and products with defective warnings, should come under a
strict liability "hindsight" rule as defectively manufactured prod-
ucts did, or whether they should come under a more realistic "fore-
seeability" rule.29
From this long, and often torturous, evolutionary process, a sur-
prising consensus of state products liability law has emerged which
favors the latter approach for defective design and defective warn-
ing cases, separate and apart from any traditional section 402A
analysis, and largely based upon state legislative tort reform.30 In
addition, an overwhelming consensus of case law now favors apply-
ing some kind of risk-utility balancing test to judge the adequacy
or inadequacy of product design and marketing,3' even though sec-
28. See, e.g., WiLLIA L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 96 (3d ed. 1964)
(where Professor Prosser, who was instrumental in drafting the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, envisioned Sec. 402A to have its primary effect on cases of manufacturing defects);
see also George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10 CARV0zo L.
REv. 2301 (1989).
29. See, e.g., Shiela L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for a Design Defect: From Negli-
gence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REv. 593 (1980); James
A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Product Design: A Proposed
Statutory Reform, 56 N.C. L. REV. 625 (1978); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski,
Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 265 (1990).
30. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Stargazing: The Future
of American Products Liability Law, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1332 (1991).
Design-defect litigation already has become more balanced. State-of-the-art statutes,
or common-law defenses that are their functional equivalents, are already the law in
most jurisdictions. Courts are demanding that experts demonstrate the feasibility of
alternative designs. State court decisions calculated to expand the limits of liability
have been subject to legislative override.
Id. at 1335.
Where state courts were initially in the forefront of American strict products liability law,
much of this recent state tort reform has been enacted through legislative statutes in at
least thirty-eight states. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.12 (West 1987); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 411.310(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.75(F) (Ander-
son 1991).
31. See, e.g., Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., 741 P.2d 1240 (Colo. 1987); Aller v. Rodgers
Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1978); Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., 602 S.W.2d
429 (Ky. 1980); Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va. 1979); see
19931
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tion 402A provides for a consumer expectation test.32 Likewise,
many other products liability issues were either unresolved or to-
tally unforeseeable at the time of drafting section 402A.3
In short, a surprising consensus has now emerged in the majority
of American jurisdictions involving a demonstrated shift of judicial
and legislative attitudes in American products liability law, provid-
ing for a more balanced approach regarding the legal rights of the
manufacturer and retailer vis a vis the consumer,3 4 and resulting in
state judicial decisions which once expanded the limits of strict lia-
bility in tort now being subject to legislative override.5
also Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974) (applying Virginia
law).
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965).
33. Such issues are discussed by the following authorities: see, e.g., Murray v. Fairbanks
Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979) (analyzing the relationship between comparative fault
and strict tort liability); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976) (discussing enhanced
injuries, crashworthiness, or "second collision" liability). Crandall v. Larkin and Jones Ap-
pliance Co., 334 N.W.2d 31 (S.D. 1983) (discussing liability for the sale of used products);
Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980); (focusing on whether lia-
bility will attach even if the manufacturer met state-of-the-art standards at the time of
manufacture and sale); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 689 P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984) (discuss-
ing liability of successor corporations for product related injuries caused by their predeces-
sor corporations).
34. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. See also Theodore Eisenberg & James A.
Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 731
(1992), James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products
Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479 (1990).
35. See, e.g., James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products
Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1315
(1991).
Statutory changes in American products liability law also may come at the federal level.
See, e.g., Products Liability Fairness Act of 1991, S. 640, 102d Cong. (1991); and the Fair-
ness in Products Liability Act of 1991, H.R. 3030, 102d Cong. (1991). To date, however, such
federal regulation in the products liability sector has not been enacted by Congress. Much of
this current products liability tort reform has developed as a reaction to perceived "outra-
geous and unconscionable" damage awards in American products liability cases that detri-
mentally affect American competitiveness in the national and world market. See, Cortese &
Blaner, The Anti-Competitive Impact of U.S. Products Liability Law: Are Foreign Manu-
facturers Beating Us at Our Own Game? 9 J.L. & COM. 167 (1989); and Stayin, The U.S.
Product Liability System: A Competitive Advantage to Foreign Manufacturers, 14 CANADA-
U.S. L.J. 193 (1988). Other commentators, however, have disputed this assumption. See,
Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An Alternative Explanation for
Recent Events in Products Liability, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1990); Bill Wagner, The Two
Faces of Strict Liability: Strict Liability Isn't a Problem - It's a Solution, 19 BRIEF 13
(1989). See also the 1992 Report by the non-partisan National Center for State Courts
which found in its examination of the outcomes of 762 lawsuits in sixteen states that- (1)
corporate and government defendants win more often than individuals do; and (2) that
among automobile, medical malpractice, personal injury, and products liability suits, the
two smallest categories in litigation are products liability, which accounts for 3% of the
PRODUCTS LIABILITY TORT REFORM
Now the dust has settled. As products liability scholars James
Henderson and Aaron Twerski aptly observe:
A quarter century has passed. The pace of American products liabil-
ity litigation has been fast and furious. We can say with some confi-
dence that if we have not yet seen all the problems raised in such
litigation, we have seen most of them. It is also fair to say that al-
though courts continue to differ on many issues, enormous consen-
sus has evolved... regarding fundamental questions. In short, the
time is ripe for a true restatement of products liability law.36
Thus, those familiar with American products liability law agree
that section 402A is outdated and requires major revision.
JII. THE HENDERSON-TWERSKI PROPOSED REvISION OF SECTION
402A RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
Professor James Henderson of Cornell University Law School
and Professor Aaron Twerski of Brooklyn Law School, 7 two na-
tionally acknowledged experts and eminent scholars in the field of
American products liability law, have proposed a viable, realistic,
and objectively balanced revision of section 402A, Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which reflects and codifies the current consen-
cases, and medical malpractice, accounting for 10% This conclusion "challenges the current
perception that product liability and medical malpractice suits are rampant and that an
overhaul of the civil justice system is needed." WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 1992, at B10. See James
A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Stargazing: The Future of American Products Lia-
bility Law, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1332 (1991).
36. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1528 (1992).
37. See, e.g., JAmis A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODU&TS LiABILrrY:
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS (2d ed. 1992); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Star-
gazing: The Future of American Products Liability Law, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1332 (1991);
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability
Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263 (1991); James
A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An
Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REv. 479 (1990); Aaron D. Twerski, Seizing
the Middle Ground Between Rules and Standards in Design Defect Litigation: Advancing
Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 521 (1982); Aaron D.
Twerski et al., Shifting Perspectives in Products Liability: From Quality to Process Stan-
dards, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 347 (1980); Aaron D. Twerski, et al., The Use and Abuse of Warn-
ings in Products Liability - Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV.
495 (1976); James A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the
Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467 (1976); James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufac-
turers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLum. L. REV. 1531
(1973). Professors Henderson and Twerski recently have been named as the Reporters for
the proposed RESTATESENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF TORTS.
1993]
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sus view of American products liability law. 8 This Henderson-
Twerski Proposed Revision of 402A is an eminently sound and ob-
jective model for products liability legislation that should be
adopted and enacted by the Virginia General Assembly in the near
future.
Accordingly, the following excerpts from Professor Henderson's
and Professor Twerski's Proposed Revision are reprinted below.39
A REVISED SECTION 402A WITH REVISED COMMENTS
§ 402A SPEcIAL LIABILITY OF ONE WHO SELLS A DEFECTIVE PRODUCT
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition is subject to
liability for harm to persons or property proximately caused by the
product defect if the seller is engaged in the business of selling such
a product.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies in the case of a claim
based on a
(a) manufacturing defect even though the seller exercised all
possible care in the preparation and marketing of the product;
or
(b) design defect only if the foreseeable risks of harm
presented by the product, when and as marketed, could have
been reduced at reasonable cost by the seller's adoption of a
safer design; or
(c) warning defect only if the seller failed to provide reasona-
ble instructions or warnings about nonobvious product-related
dangers that were known, or should have been known, to the
seller.
COMMENTS:
a. This section states a special rule of tort liability applicable to
commercial sellers of products. The liability established in this sec-
38. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512 (1992) [hereinafter Pro-
posed Revision]. Henderson and Twerski state:
We began [these] revision efforts with the guiding principle that we would seek to
write a Revised Restatement section that reflects those areas in which the courts by
and large agree. We were pleased to discover that substantial agreement exists over
much of the terrain of products liability law. Our Revised Restatement, together with
our "official" comments, reflects this consensus.
Id. at 1546.
39. Id. at 1514-26. Copyright 1992. Cornell Law Review. Reprinted with permission.
[Vol. 27:857
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tion draws on both warranty law and tort law. The provision holding
a seller liable for harm caused by manufacturing defects even
though the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and marketing of the product reflects the heritage of warranty. The
provisions holding sellers liable for design and warning defects re-
flect the influence of tort law's traditional risk-utility balancing. The
liability set forth in this section should not be confused with liability
arising from abnormally dangerous activities, described in §§ 519-
520 of the Restatement of Torts, Second. Unlike the strict liability
set forth in those sections, under which defendants may be held lia-
ble even if their activities are socially useful and reasonably con-
ducted, this section requires the plaintiff to establish that the prod-
uct that caused the harm was defective in one or more of the
manners prescribed herein.
b. History. As comment g explains in greater detail, manufactur-
ing defects are dangerous departures from a product's intended de-
sign, and typically occur in only a small percentage of units in a
product line. The imposition of liability for defectively manufac-
tured products has a long history in the common law. As early as
1266, special criminal statutes were enacted in England imposing li-
ability upon victualers, vintners, brewers, butchers, cooks, and other
persons who supplied contaminated food or drink. In the early
1960s, American courts came to recognize that a seller of any prod-
uct containing a manufacturing defect should be liable in tort for
harm caused by the defect regardless of the plaintiffs ability to
maintain a traditional negligence or warranty action. Liability would
attach even if the manufacturer's quality control in producing the
defective product was not negligent. Furthermore, the plaintiff need
not be in direct privity with the defendant seller to bring an action.
This cause of action for defectively manufactured products, recog-
nized by American courts since the early 1960s, is a hybrid. It
merges the no-negligence aspects of implied warranty with the no-
privity aspects of tort.
Design and warning defects occur when the intended designs and/
or modes of marketing are unreasonably dangerous; if the design or
marketing of a product is defective, every unit in the product line is
defective. See comment h. Liability for design and warning defects
was a relatively rare phenomenon until the late 1960s and early
1970s. A host of limited-duty rules made recovery for such defects,
especially design defects, difficult to obtain. Following the erosion of
these rules, courts sought to apply the rule of tort liability without
fault to design and warning defect cases. Although numerous courts,
accepting the invitation of section 402A, held that the doctrine of
strict liability applied with equal force to all types of product de-
fects, it soon became evident that the rule created to deal with lia-
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bility for manufacturing defects could not, without considerable dif-
ficulty, be applied to design and warning defect cases. With respect
to manufacturing defects, no conceptual problems arise in identify-
ing product defects. A product unit that fails to meet the manufac-
turer's own quality standard and thereby fails to perform its in-
tended function is, almost by definition, defective. With regard to
design and warning defects, however, the product unit meets the
manufacturer's own standard of product quality; therefore, it is nec-
essary to go outside the product unit itself to define "defect."
Subsections (2)(b) and (2)(c) reflect the view adopted by most
courts that the rule developed for manufacturing defects is inappro-
priate for the resolution of design and warning defect cases. The
governing standard of liability for design and warning defects re-
quires a determination that a product's reasonably foreseeable risks
outweigh its social utility. Although the phraseology of the tests for
liability differs, at their core, subsections (2)(b) and (2)(c) both rely
on traditional risk-utility balancing.
c. Policy justifications. The rule set forth in this section estab-
lishes different standards of liability for manufacturing defects and
design and warning defects. Policy justifications that support a strict
liability rule with respect to manufacturing defects do not support
application of the same rule with regard to design and warning de-
fects. In the case of manufacturing defects, courts have supported
the rule imposing strict liability because it enhances social utility by
satisfying four major objectives. Strict liability encourages manufac-
turer investment in product safety; discourages the consumption of
defective products by causing the purchase prices of products to re-
flect the cost of defects; reduces the transaction costs involved in
litigating manufacturer fault; and promotes risk spreading by ensur-
ing that the full brunt of a product-related injury does not fall on
the victim alone.
Several important fairness concerns also support strict liability for
manufacturing defects. Consumers injured by flawed products argue
that their fundamental expectations as to product performance have
been disappointed. Their dissatisfaction is heightened because man-
ufacturers invest in quality control at consciously chosen levels. The
manufacturer's very knowledge that a predictable number of flawed
products will enter the marketplace and cause injury, lends to the
harm an element of deliberate infliction. Finally, it seems only just
that consumers who benefit from products should share, through in-
creases in the prices charged for those products, the burden of una-
voidable injury costs that result from undetectable manufacturing
defects. In contrast to manufacturing defects, design and warning
defects require more flexible definitions. In the first place, one can-
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not determine mechanically whether the design or marketing of a
product is defective; some sort of risk-utility balancing is necessary.
Products are not defective merely because their designs are danger-
ous. Users of such products must bear a substantial portion of the
responsibility for managing generic product risks. Imposing the un-
yielding liability rule established for manufacturing defects on de-
sign risks would cause more careful product users to subsidize less
careful users, a result that would be both inefficient and unfair. For
many inherent product risks, therefore, users are the best risk mini-
mizers. Risk-utility balancing is required to determine which risks
are more fairly and efficiently borne by product sellers, and thus by
users generally, and which should be borne by individual by product
users who suffer injury.
Moreover, for the liability system to be fair and efficient, risk-util-
ity balancing must be accomplished in light of the knowledge of
risks and risk avoidance techniques reasonably available at the time
of distribution. Application of a rule holding manufacturers liable
for risks that were not foreseeable when the product was marketed
might arguably foster increased manufacturer investment in safety.
However, insurers cannot provide coverage for unforeseeable or in-
determinable risks. Furthermore, to impose liability for unforesee-
able and hence incalculable risks would violate a manufacturer's
right to be held to a liability standard that it is capable of meeting.
For these reasons, subsection (2)(b) applies risk-utility balancing to
the product "when and as marketed," and subsection (2)(c) holds
sellers liable for failing to warn of non-obvious risks "that were
known, or should have been known, to the seller."
d. One who sells any product. The rule stated in this section ap-
plies only to those who distribute products in commercial markets.
It does not impose strict liability on those who primarily distribute
services even if, while performing their services, they cause damage
through the use of defective products. For example, hospitals and
physicians are not held strictly liable when defective instruments
they have used to perform medical procedures cause injury. Often a
commercial provider of services uses a product ancillary to the per-
formance of a service, in a manner analogous to a sale. Thus, a prod-
uct repairer may use a replacement' part ancillary to the repair ser-
vice, or a beauty parlor may provide a hair treatment product while
performing the services of a beautician. Many courts have applied
the rule of this section to cover such product-related transactions.
Others have drawn a sharp distinction between sale and service, ap-
plying strict products liability only to the former and leaving the
latter to be governed by the rules of negligence.
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The rule stated in this section is not limited to traditional com-
mercial sales of products. Other forms of mass-marketing are suffi-
ciently sale-like that courts have treated them as the functional
equivalent of product sales. Commercial lessors of products for con-
sumer use are thus liable for injuries caused by defective products
that they lease to consumers. Courts have also extended the rule of
this section to include mass-produced housing marketed by develop-
ers, although sales of real property were not historically within the
ambit of product sales. When courts find that the policy justifica-
tions set forth in Comment c are fully applicable to the enterprise in
question, they tend to impose the rule stated in this section with
little regard to the formal structure of the underlying transaction.
By and large, the rule stated in this section leaves such decisions to
the developing case law.
e. Alternative liability. For the most part, traditional principles of
causation govern products liability litigation under the rule stated in
this section. See comment 1. Thus, it is the plaintiff's burden in
most cases to establish that a given product unit sold by a manufac-
turer or other seller caused or enhanced his injury. Notwithstanding
this general rule, this section is not intended to limit the developing
case law imposing alternative liability on manufacturers in special
circumstances. A significant number of courts have applied various
forms of alternative liability to drug manufacturers, almost exclu-
sively in cases involving DES, even though no specific product unit
can be shown to be directly responsible for the plaintiff's injury. The
long latency period between exposure and manifest injury in such
cases, coupled with the generic nature of the medication and the
lack of recordkeeping necessary for defendant identification, has led
some courts to set aside the traditional rules regarding causation.
Other courts have failed to follow this lead. The rule stated in this
section sets forth the traditional causation rule as the governing
standard. This comment recognizes that digressions from the rule
may be called for in unusual circumstances. However, when defend-
ant identification is possible, courts should be reluctant to abandon
traditional causation principles. For this reason, even courts that
have embraced alternative liability in latent drug injury cases have
not done so in asbestos injury cases.
f. Business of selling such a product. The rule stated in this sec-
tion applies to anyone in the business of selling the type of product
that injured the plaintiff. The seller's business need not be limited
to the sale of such products. However, the rule does not cover occa-
sional sales outside the regular course of business (frequently re-
ferred to as "casual sales"). Thus, a manufacturer who occasionally
sells surplus or used equipment does not fall within the ambit of
this rule.
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Traditionally, intermediaries such as wholesalers, retailers and
distributors have been held strictly liable as sellers. Their status
under current law is less certain. Some courts continue to treat them
as sellers within the scope of this section. However, a substantial
number of states have enacted legislation absolving non-manufac-
turer sellers of strict liability if the manufacturer is subject to the
jurisdiction of the court and is capable of paying a potential judg-
ment. Other states have reached similar results through judicial in-
terpretation of the strict liability doctrine. The rule in this section
leaves such issues to developing case law and statutes.
The rule stated in this section applies primarily to sellers of new
products. The liability of commercial sellers of used products has
been widely debated in the courts. Every court agrees that such sell-
ers are liable for their negligence, but whether they may be held
strictly liable is disputed. A majority of courts take the position that
imposing strict liability on commercial sellers of used products does
not further the policies expressed in comment c. On this view, used
product markets are open to such variation that consumers are bet-
ter served by freeing the market of the strictures of strict liability. A
minority of courts have held that imposing strict liability pressures
such sellers to improve inspection of used goods before placing them
on the market, thus enhancing the safety of such consumer goods.
The rule stated in this section takes no position on this issue, leav-
ing its resolution to developing case law.
g. Manufacturing defects. A product is defective under subsection
(2) (a) if it fails to meet the manufacturer's internal quality stan-
dards. The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that such a de-
fect existed in the product when it left the hands of the defendant-
seller. It is disputed whether the plaintiff must establish the specific
defect that caused the harm. Some courts have held that reasonable
inferences may support a finding of liability under subsection (2)(a).
Whether a given factual record supports such an inference is an is-
sue for the court to decide as a matter of law in the first instance. In
cases in which reasonable persons could differ, the issue is for the
trier of fact.
Courts have struggled with the application of this standard in
cases regarding foodstuffs. Some have created a "foreign-natural"
distinction, holding that foreign matter constitutes a defect whereas
parts of the foodstuff that are natural to it, even if hazardous, do
not. Thus, a fish bone in fish chowder has been held to be natural,
whereas a chicken bone in a chicken sandwich has been held to be
foreign matter. Courts have increasingly rejected this distinction,
opting instead for a consumer-expectation test under which a food-
stuff is defective if it contains matter not expected by a reasonable
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consumer. Although the consumer-expectation test has been widely
criticized when applied in generic defect cases (see comment h), it
seems peculiarly adapted to cases involving manufacturing defects
in foodstuffs.
h. Design defects. Courts have created several different tests to
establish liability for design defects. A majority of courts use some
version of a risk-utility balancing test, either by directly adopting a
negligence approach or by adopting some version of the approach
set forth in this section. Liability attaches only when the plaintiff
proves that the defendant failed to adopt a safer, cost-effective de-
sign that would have prevented all or part of the plaintiff's harm. A
significant number of courts, however, make recovery dependent on
whether the product design fails to meet reasonable consumer ex-
pectations. Most of these courts also consider the availability of a
reasonable-cost, safer alternative design in deciding whether the de-
fendant's design is acceptable. Admittedly, the formal structure of
the liability standard differs somewhat from one court to another.
Whether the risk-utility balancing test is based on the view of the
reasonable consumer or the reasonable product seller is a detail left
to the various jurisdictions.
The requirement in subsection (2)(b) that the plaintiff demon-
strates that a safer design could have been adopted at reasonable
cost introduces an important element of materiality. The alternative
design must be sufficiently safer than the actual design to have pre-
vented or substantially reduced the harm for which the plaintiff
seeks recovery. See comment 1. Thus, in almost every case, the
plaintiff must do more than merely show that the defendant's design
could have been made "just a little safer."
At bottom, the "reasonable cost, safer design" approach discussed
in this section is that taken by a majority of American courts. A few
courts have adopted idiosyncratic tests for design defect. For exam-
ple, one state court applies a standard whereby the manufacturer is
the "guarantor" of the product's safety. Another appears to apply a
consumer-expectation test that has no risk-utility component. These
opinions are not consistent with the rule stated in this section.
i. Categorical design liability not recognized. By explicitly refer-
ring to risk reduction through the adoption of a reasonable cost,
safer design, subsection (2) (b) makes clear that the social risk-utility
balancing employed in judging the reasonableness of product de-
signs will not be undertaken on a categorical basis. For the purpose
of this analysis, product categories are relatively broad subsets of
products for which, given their inherent design characteristics, no
adequate alternatives are available. Examples include alcoholic bev-
erages, tobacco products, handguns and above-ground swimming
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pools. With respect to a product in such categories, plaintiffs are
unable to prove the availability of a safer design that does not elimi-
nate the inherent characteristic that renders the product and other
similar products attractive in the marketplace. For example, remov-
ing the alcohol from an alcoholic beverage not only removes the
product from the category of alcoholic beverages, but also renders it
unattractive to most consumers of alcoholic beverages. Alcohol-free
"alcoholic beverages" are not, therefore, available to most consumers
at "reasonable cost." A plaintiff could attack such a product for its
alcoholic quality only by attacking the larger category of alcoholic
beverages as somehow per se unreasonably dangerous, something
which subsection (2)(b) disallows.
Although courts in a few jurisdictions have purportedly allowed
plaintiffs to condemn broad product categories as unreasonably dan-
gerous, those decisions have been overturned by statute. The inher-
ent risks associated with product categories are typically open and
obvious, and can be adequately managed in the marketplace. More-
over, the legal and factual issues raised in categorical product design
litigation are beyond the capacities of courts to resolve. Decisions
regarding which product categories should generally be available to
users and consumers are best left to the marketplace or, in rare in-
stances, to governmental regulators other than courts.
Of course, when a plaintiff can establish that a manufacturing de-
fect caused injury; or that a product unit could have been designed
more safely without eliminating inherent characteristics that both
define it categorically and make it desirable for use and consump-
tion; or that a product unit could have been distributed with more
adequate and useful instructions and warnings, then the rule stated
in this Section supports liability. But judicial attacks on product
categories, as such, are not recognized.
j. Warning defects. Subsection (2)(c) embraces a rule of liability
long recognized by American courts: product sellers have a duty to
provide reasonable instructions or warnings about nonobvious risks
of injury associated with their products whenever a reasonable per-
son in the seller's position would have, or reasonably should have,
known of such risks of injury and could have supplied instructions
or warnings to someone in a position to act effectively on such infor-
mation. In most cases, the duty is based on the seller's knowledge at
the time of sale, but under special circumstances post-sale duties to
warn, based on later-acquired knowledge, may arise.
In any event, risks that should be obvious to reasonable persons
need not be instructed about or warned against. In determining
whether a risk is sufficiently obvious not to require a warning, judges
have an important initial role to play in screening cases and keeping
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clear cases from the jury. It is anticipated, however, that obvi-
ousness of risk will be assessed by the jury in all cases in which rea-
sonable minds might differ.
Product warnings help to reduce risks when supplied to persons in
positions to act effectively on that information. Thus, the persons to
whom product warnings should be given typically include users and
consumers, but also include anyone who a reasonable distributor
should know is in a position to respond to the instruction or warning
by reducing or eliminating the risk of injury. The requirement in
subsection 402A(1) that the defective condition be shown to have
"proximately caused" the harm to persons or property imposes on
plaintiffs in warning cases the burden of proving that, if an adequate
instruction or warning had been supplied, use and consumption
would have been altered so as to reduce or eliminate the plaintiff's
injury.
k. Prescription drugs (first alternative). Subject to the limitation
recognized in comment i, courts may legitimately entertain causes of
action based on most claims of defective product design. Notwith-
standing this general rule, the overwhelming majority of jurisdic-
tions have taken the position that a court is not to substitute its
judgment for that of the prescribing physician regarding the design
of a prescription drug. As long as the drug is marketed with warn-
ings that adequately inform the prescribing physician of the drug's
foreseeable dangers, the manufacturer is not held to the risk-utility
standard set forth in subsection (2)(b). The position stated in this
Comment applies to all prescription drugs as a matter of law, requir-
ing no case-by-case examination of the risks and benefits of individ-
ual prescription drugs that are the subject of litigation.
k. Prescription drugs (second alternative). Subject to the limita-
tion recognized in comment i, courts may legitimately entertain
causes of action based on claims of inadequate design utilizing nor-
mal risk-utility standards. Notwithstanding this general rule, a ma-
jority of American jurisdictions recognize that special problems at-
tend design defect litigation with respect to prescription drugs.
Different drugs provide benefits to various subgroups of patients. It
is normally the decision of the prescribing physician, who has re-
ceived adequate warnings of the drug's benefits and detriments,
whether or not to prescribe the drug. Thus, the only basis on which
courts traditionally have held drug manufacturers liable is unreason-
able failure to warn of known or knowable risks.
On occasion, however, drug designs are attacked as unsound on
the ground that the harms they cause outweigh their overall benefit
to society. A majority of courts have taken the position that drug
design litigation is unwise, and that a drug manufacturer has a duty
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only to warn prescribing physicians of foreseeable risks. Other
courts allow design defect cases against the manufacturer of a pre-
scription drug, but only after the trial court has made an initial de-
termination that the risk-utility design standard may have been
needlessly violated. Even courts that allow design defect litigation
involving prescription drugs recognize that risk-utility balancing can
only be accomplished based on the knowledge that was or should
reasonably have been available to the drug manufacturer. Thus,
when a court declares that a prescription drug is not subject to a
design defect action it has for all practical purposes eliminated ac-
tions based on both negligence and strict liability. Of course a drug
manufacturer can always be held liable for failing to warn about
risks associated with ingestion of the drug, pursuant to comment j.
1. Proximate causation. As subsection 402A(l) makes clear the
product defect must have proximately caused the plaintiff's harm
for liability to be imposed under the rule stated in this Section.
Courts differ widely regarding how they talk about causation in
products liability cases. Previous comments dealing with other pro-
visions have referred to the causation issue. Regardless of the rele-
vant terminology, causation presents four discrete factual issues in
this context. Not every case involves all four; many cases are prob-
lematic with respect only to one or at most two such issues. And
some courts merge these discrete causation issues under broader
headings that tend to obscure the differences. But close analysis of
decisions from many different jurisdictions suggests that, beneath
the differing and often confusing rhetoric, products liability litiga-
tion presents these four basic factual issues.
First, the tribunal must determine whether the product unit (or in
the case of alternative liability, a product unit in the product line -
see comment e) was a but-for cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's harm.
Second, the tribunal must determine (subject to the alternative lia-
bility exception discussed in comment e) whether the defendant
commercially distributed the product unit. Third, the tribunal must
determine whether the defective condition of the product unit was a
but-for cause of the plaintiff's harm. And fourth, the court must de-
termine whether the type of harm suffered by the plaintiff was
among the types of harm reasonably foreseeable when the defendant
distributed the defective product unit. In most cases courts place on
the plaintiff the burden of proof regarding causation.
In connection with the third causation issue - whether the defec-
tive condition of the product was a but-for cause of the plaintiff's
harm - the plaintiff bears three different burdens of proof, depend-
ing on the type of defect involved. In cases involving manufacturing
defects, the plaintiff must prove that the same harm would not have
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occurred had the product unit not contained the defect. In cases in-
volving design defects, the plaintiff must prove that the same harm
would not have occurred had the defendant adopted the safer design
suggested by the plaintiff. And in cases involving warning defects,
the plaintiff must prove that the same harm would not have oc-
curred had the defendant provided adequate instructions or
warnings.
Again, courts employ different terminology to describe these cau-
sation issues. Some courts refer to the first and second issues, taken
together, as "cause-in-fact" and the third and fourth, taken to-
gether, as "proximate causation." Other courts refer to the first and
third issues, taken together, as "cause-in-fact;" the second issue as
"defendant identification;" and the fourth issue, taken alone, as
"proximate cause." And some lump all four questions together
under the broad umbrella terms "substantial factor," "legal cause,"
"superceding or intervening cause" or "proximate causation." The
rule stated in this section leaves the nuances of causation terminol-
ogy to the developing case law. Nevertheless, enhanced clarity would
result if courts utilized the functional definitions set forth in this
comment.
m. Warranty. Most jurisdictions apply the rule stated in this sec-
tion under the rubric of tort. Admittedly, the same liability rules
could emanate from the action for breach of implied warranty of
merchantability under the Uniform Commercial Code. Numerous
courts have held that the rule stated in this section and implied
warranty of merchantability are virtually identical. Factors collat-
eral to the basic liability rule in this section support the preference
for the tort characterization over that of implied warranty. For ex-
ample, if the warranty framework were utilized, defendants would
contend that the U.C.C. statute of limitations, which runs from the
time of sale, should govern, rather than the tort statute of limita-
tions, which runs from the time of injury. Or it could be argued that
privity limitations, which still retain considerable vigor under tradi-
tional contract law, should define the eligibility of parties to suit.
Furthermore, courts might be more likely to recognize disclaimers or
other contract-based limitations on recovery if the action were con-
tract-based rather than rooted in tort law. Placing the rule stated in
this section firmly within tort doctrine permits courts to sidestep
these issues.
Nonetheless, several jurisdictions have insisted that products lia-
bility cases based on the rule stated in this section be prosecuted
under the Uniform Commercial Code. For the most part, they have
utilized creative statutory interpretations to reach results closely
analogous to those reached by courts utilizing the implied warranty
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doctrine. Occasionally, decisions utilizing "implied warranty strict li-
ability" for product-related personal injury, reflecting the influence
of contract doctrine. These nuances tend to be of minor importance.
Courts generally have cut through to the bone to determine the es-
sence of the cause of action. Even if the Uniform Commercial Code
provides the label for the cause of action, tort doctrine defines the
relevant issues for decision.
n. Contributory fault. The application of the contributory fault
doctrine to products liability claims raises both serious policy issues
and difficult questions of implementation. At the policy level, it has
been argued that reducing the plaintiff's recovery by the percentage
of his fault compromises the policy decision to impose primary re-
sponsibility for such injuries on manufacturers to encourage them to
produce safer products. At the level of practical implementation,
courts have noted that comparing the fault of the plaintiff to a de-
fect in the product is no easy task. This is especially true with re-
gard to manufacturing defect cases in which no form of risk-utility
balancing is utilized in establishing the defect. Notwithstanding
these arguments, a majority of courts use comparative fault to re-
duce the recovery of a products liability plaintiff whose negligence
has contributed to his injury. In cases involving design and warning
defects, the issue takes on an added dimension because the defect is
often the manufacturer's failure to account for foreseeable (albeit
arguably unreasonable) conduct on the part of the plaintiff. Thus,
some courts hesitate to find plaintiffs contributorily at fault in de-
sign and warning defect cases. On the other hand, relieving consum-
ers of all responsibility for safe product use defeats the objectives of
products liability and runs against the grain of common sense. See
comment c. The rule stated in this section accepts the majority view,
allowing comparative fault to operate as a partial or total defense to
a product liability claim depending on the general comparative fault
rules in a given jurisdiction. This section takes no position on
whether some forms of comparative fault should not be allowed as a
defense or even partial mitigation; nor does it resolve the issue of
whether assumption of the risk should operate as a total bar in some
instances. This section leaves these issues for the developing case
law.
o. Misuse, alteration and modification. Occasionally a product is
subject to post-sale misuse, alteration or modification. When third
persons engage in such conduct, its effects will be determined under
the rules of proximate cause that govern products liability cases. See
Comment 1. When plaintiffs engage in such conduct, its effects will
ordinarily be determined by the rules of comparative fault set forth
herein. See comment n. Occasionally plaintiff's misconduct is so
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egregious that it constitutes an intervening cause, eliminating. the
defendant's liability altogether.
p. Pure economic loss. The rule stated in this Section applies only
to products that cause harm to persons or property. Where the
plaintiff suffers only economic loss (e.g., loss of profits, costs of re-
pair or replacement of the defective product), recovery is governed
by the rules of the Uniform Commercial Code. The line of demarca-
tion between physical damage to property and pure economic loss is
not easy to draw. The courts appear intent on distinguishing be-
tween tort and contract, based on the nature of damages suffered. In
doing so they generally pay little attention to whether the defective
product had the inherent potential to cause serious physical harm to
persons or property. This section leaves these issues for the develop-
ing case law.
IV. A COMPARISON OF CURRENT VIRGINIA PRODUCTS LIABmITY
LAW WITH THE HENDERSON-TWERSKI PROPOSED REVISION OF
SECTION 402A OF THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
A. Introduction
Virginia products liability law recognizes two major causes of ac-
tion: a negligence action in tort, and a warranty action in con-
tract.40 The negligence action is based almost entirely on case
law;41 and the warranty action rests on the Virginia version of the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C). 42
The overwhelming majority of states, however, have adopted a
more unified approach to products liability law. At least thirty-
four states have judicially adopted section 402A of the Second Re-
statement of Torts.43 Five states have passed statutes adopting sec-
40. There is also a third, less utilized, products liability cause of action that is still recog-
nized in Virginia: tortious misrepresentation. See Glen Falls Ins. Co. v. Long, 213 Va. 776,
195 S.E.2d 887 (1973); Packard Norfolk, Inc. v. Miller, 198 Va. 557, 95 S.E.2d 207 (1956).
See ROBERT I. STEVENSON, VIRGINIA AND WEST VIRGINIA PRODUCTS LABILrrY 5-9 (1983) and
SPAHN & DRAIM, supra note 9 at 96-98.
41. See, e.g., Featherall v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 219 Va. 949, 252 S.E.2d 358
(1979); Logan v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 216 Va. 425, 219 S.E.2d 685 (1975).
42. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.2-313 to -316 (Repl. Vol. 1991) (defining and explaining
three types of warranties: express warranties, implied warranties of fitness for a particular
purpose, and the implied warranty of merchantability).
43. For comprehensive citations to case law, see American Law of Products Liability 3d,
supra note 2, § 16:9 (1987).
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tion 402A." Eight states have adopted a strict liability in tort rem-
edy that differs somewhat from section 402A.45
Section 402A was promulgated by the American Law Institute in
1963, and nearly the entire body of modern American products lia-
bility case law has developed since that promulgation.
With an eye to revising section 402A to meet the current and
future needs and the realities of American products liability law,
Professors James Henderson and Aaron Twerski have developed a
proposed revision to section 402A.46 This proposed revision incor-
porates the current American consensus regarding the elements,
defenses, and general application of American strict products lia-
bility law in tort.4
7
The proposed revision, incorporating the modern national con-
sensus in American products liability law, differs from existing Vir-
ginia law on some issues. Nevertheless, because the proposed revi-
sion provides a current, realistic, and unified version of American
products liability law today, it provides an apt model for codifica-
tion in Virginia.
It is the purpose of this section to note the similarities and dif-
ferences between the proposed revision and existing Virginia prod-
ucts liability law, in order to explore the ramifications of adopting
the proposed revision as Virginia law.
B. Tort v. Warranty Actions
The proposed revision sets out standards for strict tort liability.
The commentary accompanying the revision recognizes that the
history of products liability is closely tied to warranty law and to
the Uniform Commercial Code.48 Nevertheless, comment m makes
it clear that the proposed revision oily provides for a tort cause of
action.49 Accordingly, warranty actions still would constitute an in-
dependent'cause of action under the U.C.C. when appropriate.5 0
44. AR. CODE ANN. § 4-86-102 (Michie 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-3 (West 1992);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 221 (West 1991); Op- REv. STAT. § 30.920 (1991); and S.C.
CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (Law. Co-Op. 1991).
45. See, Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) for a listing of these various
strict liability in tort actions in each state.
46. See generally Part III of this Article supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
47. Proposed Revision, supra note 38.
48. Id. at 1514-16 cmt. a; 1524-26 cmts. a, b, c, m, p.
49. Id. at 1524-25 cmt.m.
50. See, e.g. at 1524 cmt. m (warranty).
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1. The Proposed Revision, comments a-c, m, and p
The proposed revision provides a tort action only fdr personal
injury and property damage. Its purpose in establishing such strict
tort liability, according to the commentary, is to provide recovery
for harm to person or property. Therefore, comment p confines re-
covery for purely economic loss to the warranty rules of the Uni-
form Commercial Code.5' The comment notes the difficulty of
keeping economic loss distinct from property damage. Professors
Henderson and Twerski, for example, offer the criticism that many
courts have paid insufficient attention to a product's inherent po-
tential to cause harm when distinguishing economic loss from
property damage. Nevertheless, the authors leave such issues to
the individual states.2
Comment m addresses the differences of strict tort and warranty
actions, providing as examples statutes of limitation, and problems
with contractual privity.53 Moreover, where warranty law recog-
nizes the validity of contractual disclaimers limiting or abolishing
liability, such disclaimers have no effect on tort actions under the
proposed revision. 4
Therefore, the proposed revision adopts the higher strict liability
standard for tort actions that most states, including Virginia, have
already adopted for breach of implied or express warranties. By
allowing liability under a strict tort theory, the proposed revision
overcomes traditional warranty problems of privity, product dis-
claimers, limitation of damages, notice requirements, and limita-
tions as to when an action accrues.
2. Existing Virginia Law
Under existing Virginia law, a breach of warranty action pro-
vides relief in situations where it might be unobtainable in a negli-
gence action. For example, where contributory negligence bars a
Admittedly, the same liability rules could emanate from the action for breach of implied
warranty of merchantability under the Uniform Commercial Code.
Id.
Actionable U.C.C. remedies would remain distinct from tort remedies in actions for pure
economic loss, or in the sale of used products, for example.
51. Id. at 1526 cmt. p.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1524-25 cmt. m.
54. Id.
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tort product liability action under the negligence standard, con-
tributory negligence will not defeat a warranty action.5 5 The stan-
dard of product safety in each cause of action is similar, but the
plaintiff's burden of proof in a negligence action is much greater
than in a warranty action.
The elements of a products liability case in Virginia, whether
sounding in negligence or based upon a breach of warranty, are
said to be the "same" in both causes of action. The plaintiff must
show: (1) that the goods were unreasonably dangerous either for
the use to which they would ordinarily be put, or for some other
reasonably foreseeable purpose; and (2) that the unreasonably dan-
gerous condition existed when the goods left the defendant's
hands.56 In reality, however, negligence and breach of warranty ac-
tions have important differences.
For both tort and warranty actions, the plaintiff must demon-
strate the existence of a product defect. These product defects fall
into one of three categories: (1) manufacturing defects; (2) design
defects: and (3) warning defects. Part D of this Section discusses
these product defect categories at length.57
In Virginia, the manufacturer's liability under a breach of war-
ranty theory is said to be "akin to strict liability" in contract.5 8 In
an existing tort action, however, the plaintiff needs to show further
55. For example, in Featherall v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 219 Va. 949, 252 S.E.2d
358 (1979), the plaintiff operated a pressure regulator after a locknut had been removed.
The purpose of this locknut had been to ensure an upper limit to the amount of pressure
the regulator could allow. Use of the regulator without the locknut was misuse of the prod-
uct, but because it was foreseeable that someone might remove the locknut, this foreseeable
misuse did not provide a defense to the warranty suit. Id. See also White Consolidated
Indus. Inc. v. Swiney, 237 Va. 23, 29-30, 376 S.E.2d 283, 285-86 (1989) (discussing product
misuse and assumption of the risk, but refusing to discuss contributory negligence because
the issues were in warranty); Brockett v. Harrell Bros., Inc., 206 Va. 457, 143 S.E.2d 897
(1965) (considering on appeal only the warranty aspects of the case because the trial court
verdict for the defendants on the issue of contributory negligence settled the negligence
issues).
56. Harris-Teeter, Inc. v. Burroughs, 241 Va. 1, 4, 399 S.E.2d 801, 802 (1991) (quoting
Logan v Montgomery Ward, 216 Va. 425, 428, 219 S.E.2d 685, 687 (1975)). This test argua-
bly adopts the language of § 402A, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToaTS, subjected to the de-
fense of contributory negligence.
57. See infra notes 114-79 and accompanying text. See generally SPAHN & DRAIM, supra
note 9; STEVENSON, supra note 40.
58. See Bly v. Otis Elevator Co., 713 F.2d 1040, 1045-46 (4th Cir. 1983) (comparing war-
ranty analysis to strict tort liability analysis and noting the difference between them and
negligence).
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that the manufacturer's conduct was negligent. 59 The negligence
cause of action imposes a higher standard of proof on the plaintiff
than does the breach of warranty action.60 As a corollary, the war-
ranty theory imposes liability on the defendant more readily than
does the negligence theory. The difference between the actions is
that a warranty action properly focuses on the defective condition
of the product, where a negligence action focuses instead on the
conduct of the manufacturer or seller.
Many products liability suits are brought under warranty theory
in Virginia precisely because the elements of the action are easier
to prove. Additionally, there is no contributory negligence bar in
warranty actions."' Nevertheless, there may be a disadvantage to
warranty actions insofar as the manufacturer or seller may attempt
to disclaim the implied warranties of merchantability62 and fitness
for a particular purpose, 3 and arguably even disclaim express
warranties. 4
Exactly how a manufacturer or seller may disclaim warranties or
limit damages is still an open question in Virginia. The Supreme
Court of Virginia has held that a seller can exclude implied war-
ranties of fitness and merchantability in a suit for rescission of a
sales contract without running afoul of state public policy.6 5 But
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, pur-
portedly applying Virginia law, has stated that such disclaimers or
limitations are presumptively unconscionable when an action is for
personal injuries.66 Therefore, it is not clear under present Virginia
59. Abbott v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1115 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 908 (1988); accord Bly v. Otis Elevator Co., 713 F.2d at 1044.
60. See Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967, 968-69 (4th Cir. 1971) (stating that
negligence adds an additional element to strict liability in that the product defect must
result from the defendant's failure to exercise due care).
61. Brockett v. Harrell Bros., Inc., 206 Va. 457, 463, 143 S.E.2d 897, 902 (1965).
62. For the definition and effects of the implied warranty of merchantability, see VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.2-314 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
63. For the definition and effects of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose, see id. § 8.2-315 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
64. Id. § 8.2-316 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
65. Marshall v. Murray Oldsmobile Co., 207 Va. 972, 977-78, 154 S.E.2d 140, 144-45
(1967).
66. Matthews v. Ford Motor Co., 479 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1973) (relying on VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.2-719 (Repl. Vol. 1991), which brands limitation of consequential damages for personal
injury as prima facie unconscionable and distinguishing Marshall v. Murray Oldsmobile Co.,
207 Va. 972, 154 S.E.2d 140 (1966) (holding that a disclaimer of implied warranties was not
contrary to public policy) as involving rescission, not personal injuries, and as having been
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law whether a seller can or cannot disclaim warranties or limit
damages where there are personal injuries involved.
The issue of privity, however, does not differ in Virginia between
negligence and warranty causes of action for damages resulting
from personal injury. Lack of privity is not a defense "in any ac-
tion. . . against the manufacturer or seller ... for breach of war-
ranty. . . or for negligence. . . if the plaintiff was a person whom
the manufacturer or seller might reasonably have expected to use,
consume, or be affected by the goods .... ,67
This privity relaxation appears to extend to property loss as
well. Virginia has recognized the distinction between pure eco-
nomic loss and harm to person or property, and has relegated
claims for pure economic loss suits only to the warranty cause. In
Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neale Architects, Inc.,"s the Su-
preme Court of Virginia recognized various definitions of purely
economic loss. These included disappointed economic expectation,
damage only to the product itself by the product, and damage to
expectations based on duties created by bargaining. The court ap-
pears to have adopted the theory that pure economic loss results
when the product defect causes only diminution in its own value.6 9
The court noted that plaintiffs may avail themselves to the relaxa-
tion of privity requirements associated with tort actions only when
negligence constitutes a danger to safety of person or property.70
However, the court also curiously affirms the position that, for ex-
pectation loss caused by a breach of contracted-for duties, the
privity rules of contract law still govern.7 1
Regarding other limitations of actions, where there is personal
injury, the general rule is that "every action for personal injuries,
whatever the theory of recovery . . . shall be brought within two
years after the cause of action accrues. ' '7 2 Personal injury accrual
decided under the U.C.C., whereas the Matthews facts occurred prior to Virginia's adoption
of the U.C.C.).
67. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
68. 236 Va. 419, 374 S.E.2d 55 (1988).
69. Id. at 425, 374 S.E.2d at 58 (holding that because a leak in a pool installed as part of
new home construction damaged part of the home, and the defect in the pool was a defect in
the whole package, the harm, as a harm by the product to itself, was a purely economic loss
giving rise only to a warranty cause of action).
70. Id. at 422, 374 S.E.2d at 57.
71. Id. at 425, 374 S.E.2d at 58.
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243(A) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
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occurs on the date the injury occurs. 3 For property damage the
period is five years,7 4 but accrual occurs "when the breach of con-
tract or duty occurs" in warranty and negligence suits respec-
tively.75 This starts the statute running at the time of sale, rather
than at the time of injury for both actions.
3. Comparison of Virginia Law and the Proposed Revision
Both existing Virginia law and the proposed revision confine re-
covery for purely economic loss to warranty actions. The Supreme
Court of Virginia has defined purely economic loss,78 and the pro-
posed revision does not purport to disturb the court's definition.
Nevertheless, the proposed revision imposes a higher standard of
product safety on manufacturers and sellers than the Virginia neg-
ligence standard. Arguably, it also proposes a product safety stan-
dard equivalent to the present Virginia warranty standard.77
Therefore, adoption of the proposed revision would establish a tort
standard of product safety in Virginia, currently available only in
warranty. Also, the proposed revision is realistically and properly
based upon the defective condition of the product itself, rather
than the questionable conduct of the defendant.
Similarly, the proposed revision would remove the seller's ability
to avoid liability under warranty disclaimers or limitations in strict
tort liability actions.
C. Limitations to Merchants and Sales
Generally speaking, products liability law establishes liability for
manufacturers and other sellers. The subject matter of a products
liability suit is an injury to persons or property caused by a defec-
tive product. But the question arises whether non-manufacturer
sellers who are not responsible for the product defects should nev-
ertheless be held liable. Some states have passed legislation limit-
ing retailer liability.7 8 However, a majority of states presently hold
retailers and other sellers liable under strict tort products liability
73. Id. § 8.01-230.
74. Id. § 8.01-243(B) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
75. VA CODE ANN. § 8.01-230 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
76. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
78. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-402(1)(1987); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.340 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-106 (1980).
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law, although such sellers would still have indemnity or contribu-
tion actions against the manufacturer.
1. The Proposed Revision
The black letter portion of the proposed revision extends liabil-
ity only "if the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product" as the defective product that caused the harm.7 9 Accord-
ing to the commentary, this rule imposes liability on any commer-
cial seller unless the sale is occasional or casual.80 As an example,
the commentary notes that a manufacturer occasionally selling sur-
plus or used equipment is not engaged in the business of selling
that product.81
Comment f of the proposed revision notes, but leaves to develop-
ing case law or state statutes, the question of whether to hold non-
manufacturing sellers strictly liable in tort if the court has jurisdic-
tion over the product manufacturer and if the manufacturer is ca-
pable of paying the potential judgment. The proposed revision
commentary also takes no position whether to hold used product
sellers to a strict liability or to a negligence standard.82
The black letter proposed revision imposes liability on "[o]ne
who sells."83 The emphasis on sellers, however, is to distinguish
sales from services. The proposed revision does not impose strict
liability on service providers. 84 The commentary notes the treat-
ment courts have given hybrid sales/service transactions, but "does
not impose strict liability on those who distribute primarily
services. ' 8,
The commentary also notes that courts have held commercial
lessors of consumer products and developers marketing mass-pro-
duced housing to product liability standards." The commentary
recommends that courts evaluate these and other sale-like mass-
marketing under the proposed revision standards, if to do so will
fulfill the policies behind those standards. For example, if product
liability analysis of an injury resulting from a sale-like transaction
79. Proposed Revision, supra note 38, at 1514.
80. Id. at 1518 cmt. f.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1519 cmt. f.
83. Id. at 1514.
84. Id. at 1517 cmt. d.
85. Id. at 1516-17 cmts. c, d.
86. Id.
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will encourage safety or promote proper risk spreading, the trans-
action would arguably be a sale for the purposes of the Proposed
Revision.8
2. Existing Virginia Law
Warranty and tort products liability actions differ in Virginia as
to who may be liable and what transactions are covered. On the
warranty side, Virginia arguably would adhere to the sales/services
distinction."' By contrast, the negligence standard extends in a
continuum from generalized duties regarding conduct toward busi-
ness invitees or the general public to duties based on product man-
ufacturing or sale.8 This means that existing Virginia products lia-
bility law sounding in negligence may still involve provision of
services and leases, because all are still subject to a negligence
analysis.
By adopting the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), Virginia
has adopted three warranties that apply to sales. Express warran-
ties arise when "sellers" agree to them in the bargaining process.80
The implied warranty of merchantability "is implied in a contract
for ... [the] sale [of goods] if the seller is a merchant with respect
to goods of that kind."91 The warrahty of fitness for a particular
purpose arises with respect to "seller[s] at the time of
contracting. '92
Of these three warranty actions, the implied warranty of
merchantability is the most commonly used in product liability ac-
tions.93 The fitness warranty applies only if the seller knows of a
specific use the buyer plans to make of the product. 4 The
merchantability warranty, however, applies if the goods are not of
average quality.95 The usual warranty case therefore alleges that
the goods are defective because they are not of average quality. In
most circumstances, this argument is easier to make than one
under the remaining warranty actions.
87. Id.
88. See Stevenson, supra note 40, at 110-12; SPAHN & DRkiM, supra note 9, at 165-67.
89. Stevenson, supra note 40, at 13-17; SPAHN & DraM, supra note 9, at 75-80.
90. VA. CODE ANs. § 8.2-313 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
91. Id. § 8.2-314(1).
92. Id. § 8.2-315.
93. SPAHN & DRAiM, supra note 9, at 83.
94. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-315 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
95. Id. § 8.2-314(2)(b).
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Until 1992, all three warranties were restricted to sales, which
were defined as "the passing of title from the seller to the buyer
for a price." ' In 1992, the three warranties became effective for
leases when Title 8.2A of the Code of Virginia took effect.97 Prior
to that adoption, the Supreme Court of Virginia had held that the
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose did not apply
to leases. 9
As to services, there appear to be no Virginia warranty cases
dealing with the sales/services dichotomy.99 Virginia has, however,
passed a "blood shield" statute, removing the distribution of blood
products from implied warranties analysis.100 The legislature's at-
tention to this issue implies that it believed that hybrid sales/ser-
vice contracts could fall under warranty analysis where a sale of a
product is involved in a service-oriented transaction. Moreover, a
federal district court decision has noted that, even after passage of
the U.C.C., the underlying common law warranties, which need not
be confined to sales contracts, still apply in Virginia.101
Thus, Virginia law is somewhat ambiguous as to whether or not
a warranty analysis applies only to sales of goods. The statutes ex-
pressly indicate that this is true, but implicitly indicate otherwise.
The case law from at least one federal court in Virginia indicates
otherwise as well.
As to the issue of whether casual or occasional sales fall outside
a warranty analysis, the implied warranty of merchantability is
limited to "merchant[s] with respect to goods of that kind," as
noted above, but there is no such limitation on the other two war-
ranties. The supreme court has stated that there is no implied war-
ranty in the sale of a used car.10 2
On the tort side of Virginia products liability actions, because
Virginia presently adheres to a negligence standard, the line of de-
96. Id. § 8.2-106(1).
97. The warranties are provided and explained in VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.2A-210 to -213
(RepL Vol. 1991).
98. Leake v. Meredith, 221 Va. 14, 267 S.E.2d 93 (1980). For an argument that Leake is
really concerned with merchantability, see STEVENSON, supra note 40, at 10 n.12.
99. See STEVENSON, supra note 40, at 110 (stating that there are no post-U.C.C. goods/
services cases in Virginia as of 1983).
100. VA. CODE ANN. § 32-1-297 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
101. Harris v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 550 F. Supp. 1024, 1027 (W.D. Va. 1982) (referring
to Swift & Co. v. Wells, 201 Va. 213, 110 S.E.2d 203 (1959)).
102. See Smith v. Mooers, 206 Va. 307, 313, 142 S.E.2d 473, 477 (1965) (refusing to apply
the implied warranty of merchantability to a bailment).
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marcation between products liability imposition of duty and ser-
vice-oriented duty is not sharp, nor does it need to be. This negli-
gence standard applies equally to provision of services'03 and to
any sale of a product. 104
Regarding the issue of whether non-manufacturing sellers are li-
able, because the negligence standard requires evaluation of the
defendant's conduct, any seller, including the manufacturer, must
have acted in such a way as to breach a duty to the consumer. If a
seller did not participate in causing injury to the consumer, he or
she is not liable under the law of negligence.10 5
This is not the case in warranty actions, however, where a court
analyzes the condition of the product for defects, rather than the
conduct of the defendant. 0 6 Thus, in the case of manufacturing
defects, since an implied warranty of merchantability applies to
any "seller [who] is a merchant with respect to goods of that
kind,' 0 7 intermediate sellers also can be liable. Since design and
warning defect liability depends on foreseeability of the injury, and
on the availability of a better design, 08 non-manufacturing sellers
are arguably not liable for these defects. There appears to be no
Virginia law expressly on this subject. 0 9
3. Comparison of Virginia Law and the Proposed Revision
Virginia warranty law and the proposed revision both limit lia-
bility to those "engaged in the business of selling such a prod-
uct"'110 or "merchant[s] with respect to goods of that kind."' It is
103. See, e.g., Philip Morris, Inc. v. Emerson, 235 Va. 380, 368 S.E.2d 268 (1988) (holding
a waste disposal company liable for negligence in handling toxic waste); Amusement Slides
Corp. v. Lehman, 217 Va. 815, 232 S.E.2d 803 (1977) (finding the operation of a slide in an
amusement park to be negligent).
104. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Bartholomew, 224 Va. 421, 297 S.E.2d 675 (1982) (vali-
dating a jury finding of negligence in a manufacturer's design of a transmission).
105. See generally Featherall v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 219 Va. 949, 252 S.E.2d 358
(1979).
106. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-313 to -315 (Repl. Vol. 1991); See also supra note 12
and accompanying text.
107. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-314 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
108. See infra, footnotes 139-78 and accompanying text (discussing design and warning
defects).
109. See SPAHN & DRAIM, supra note 9, at 164 (citing no Virginia cases in discussion of
wholesalers, distributors, and retailers, but noting the proposition that every seller gives
implied warranties).
110. Proposed Revision supra note 38, at 1514.
111. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-314 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
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true that Virginia law may not limit express warranties or warran-
ties of fitness for a particular purpose to these sellers, but it does
so with regard to the implied warranty of merchantability, and this
warranty is most frequently utilized in product liability suits.
Virginia negligence tort law applies wherever the plaintiff can
impute a breached duty to the plaintiff. Although there are stan-
dard product liability duties imposed on manufacturers with re-
spect to product defects, 112 the negligence standard still exists for
services and for other non-manufacturing relationships involving a
duty to the consumer.
Therefore, the proposed revision would clarify who is subject to
strict tort products liability actions by codifying the parties' liabil-
ity in a strict tort action.
The proposed revision leaves the question of non-manufacturer
seller liability to developing state law, and the proposed Virginia
legislation would follow the precedents of Colorado, Kentucky, and
Tennessee in not holding a non-manufacturing seller strictly liable
in tort unless that seller knew or should have known of the product
defect.113
D. Product Defects
Products liability law identifies three separate categories of in-
jury-causing product defects: (1) manufacturing defects; (2) design
defects; and (3) warning defects.
1. Manufacturing Defects
A manufacturing defect exists when a manufacturing or assem-
bly process causes a particular example of an otherwise non-defec-
tive product line to be defective.1 1 4 The proposed revision defines
manufacturing defects as "dangerous departures from a product's
intended design"" 5 and as "fail[ing] to meet the manufacturer's
own internal quality standards."'1" 6
112. See, e.g., footnotes 114-78, infra, and accompanying text.
113. See generally discussion infra part IV.
114. See STEVENSON, supra note 40, at 13.
115. Proposed Revision supra note 38, at 1515 cmnt. b.
116. Id. at 1519 cmt. g.
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a. The Proposed Revision
The black letter portion of the proposed revision imposes liabil-
ity for manufacturing defects regardless of the level of care the
seller used in preparation or marketing.117 The only mitigation of
this liability is the requirement that the plaintiff establish that the
defect existed when the product left the hands of the seller.118
Placing such a burden on the plaintiff raises two issues. The first
issue is the evidentiary problem that arises when a product has
been destroyed: the plaintiff cannot point to the specific defect, or
show a finite causal connection between his harm and a defect in
the product. The proposed revision appears to establish liability if
"reasonable inferences support the conclusion that the defective
product caused the plaintiff's harm and that such a defect was pre-
sent . . . when [the product] left the hands of the defendant
seller." 119
The second issue is a special extension to foodstuff defects. The
proposed revision adopts the test for such defects that "a foodstuff
is defective if it contains matter not expected by a reasonable
consumer."'
20
Comment c outlines the policy justifications that support a strict
liability rule in manufacturing defect cases.' 2' Such a rule encour-
ages manufacturers to create safe products and ensures that the
market price reflects what would otherwise be the hidden costs as-
sociated with consumer injuries. These costs, rather than accruing
to individual consumers, are charged to the entire class of consum-
ers. In addition, a strict liability rule lowers litigation costs. 122 In
short, manufacturing defect injuries are random and relatively rare
events. Imposing strict tort liability would achieve all the public
policy benefits described in comment c,123 with virtually no down-
side costs.
117. Id. at 1514.
118. Id. at 1519 cmt. g.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1516-17 cmt. c.
122. Id.
123. See id.
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b. Existing Virginia Law
To establish liability for a manufacturing defect in Virginia, a
consumer-plaintiff must meet a two-pronged burden. First, the
plaintiff must show that the goods were unreasonably dangerous
for ordinary use or for a reasonably foreseeable purpose. Second,
he or she must show that the unreasonably dangerous condition
existed when the goods left the defendant's hands.124
This standard of safety is said to be the same for both negligence
and warranty causes of action.125 Nevertheless, the standard of
proof required for a negligence action is much greater than for a
warranty action. According to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit, a negligence action requires evidence of an
additional element: that the defect resulted from the defendant's
failure to exercise due care.126 Such a distinction between these
causes of action, however, may be misleading since most manufac-
turing defect cases involve both negligence and warranty claims.127
But this duality of actions clouds the issue of exactly what stan-
dard of proof a negligent manufacturing defect case, by itself,
would require.
For example, the Supreme Court of Virginia has made the fol-
lowing observation where evidence to substantiate a defect was
scarce: "[i]t is not necessary that the circumstances establish negli-
gence as the proximate cause with such certainty as to exclude
every other possible conclusion .... All that is required is that a
jury be satisfied with proof which leads to a conclusion with proba-
ble certainty where absolute logical certainty is impossible. '128
Adopting this reasoning, coupled with allowing expert testimony
regarding the probable defect in a burnt-out stove to go to the jury
as evidence of negligence, arguably approaches the leniency of a
warranty standard of proof.L1 29 The standard for a warranty cause
of action based on manufacturing defect, then, if not strict liability
in tort, is very much like it.150
124. Logan v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 216 Va. 425, 427, 219 S.E.2d 685, 687 (1975).
125. See Harris-Teeter, Inc. v. Burroughs, 241 Va. 1, 399 S.E.2d 801 (1991); Logan, 216
Va. at 427, 219 S.E.2d at 687 (1975).
126. Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967, 968-69 (4th Cir. 1971).
127. See SPAHN & DRA.m, supra note 9, at 48-49.
128. White Consol. Indus. v. Swiney, 237 Va. 23, 28, 376 S.E.2d 283, 286 (1989).
129. See id. at 27-28, 376 S.E.2d at 285-86.
130. Abbot v. American Cyanmid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1114 (4th Cir. 1988); accord SPAHN
& DRAmi, supra note 9, at 47.
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This "probable certainty" test speaks directly to the issue of
what sort of inferential evidence will support a manufacturing de-
fect case. The general rule in Virginia is that where the product
has been destroyed, or testing it directly for a defect is impossible,
then circumstantial evidence will suffice to complete a prima facie
case if a jury could reasonably infer from that evidence that a de-
fect existed when the product left the defendant's hands.""1 Courts
limit evidence admissibility, however, in negligence cases invoking
a res ipsa loquitur theory unless evidence of negligence is under
the exclusive control of the defendant and unavailable to the plain-
tiff.132 While expert witness testimony may contribute to the prob-
able certainty with which a jury must draw its conclusions, 83 ex-
pert testimony based on experimentation will be carefully
scrutinized where the actual product has been destroyed.13 As to
the special treatment of cases involving foodstuffs, the supreme
court has said that the plaintiff must show that the suspect food
contained a foreign substance.135
c. Comparison of Virginia Law and the Proposed Revision
The proposed revision would introduce a less stringent standard
of proof for the plaintiff to demonstrate in manufacturing defect
cases sounding in tort. Where Virginia tort law now requires a
showing of negligent conduct on the defendant's part, the proposed
revision would not because like warranty law, it properly deals
with the defective condition of the product itself, rather than the
questionable conduct of the defendant.
The proposed revision also imposes liability where a foodstuff
contains matter that a reasonable consumer would not expect it to
contain. Presently existing Virginia law imposes liability where a
foodstuff contains a foreign substance.
131. See Swiney, 237 Va. at 23, 376 S.E.2d at 283; Southern States Coop. v. Doggett, 223
Va. 650, 292 S.E.2d 331 (1982) (breach of warranty).
132. See Logan v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 216 Va. 425, 219 S.E.2d 685 (1975).
133. See Swiney, 237 Va. at 27-28, 376 S.E.2d at 285.
134. See Horton v. W.T. Grant Co., 537 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1976).
135. Harris-Teeter, Inc. v. Burroughs, 241 Va. 1, 399 S.E.2d 801 (1991). In Harris-Teeter,
the court applied a negligence standard assessing the defendant's behavior to find that al-
though a duty existed, placing white plastic birds on a white cake was not a breach of that
duty. Arguably, however, the standard was applied as though the case were a negligent de-
sign case. The court compared Harris-Teeter's behavior with that of other cake bakers and
decorators. See id. at 4, 399 S.E.2d at 802-03.
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In Brockett v. Harrell Bros.,1 86 the Virginia Supreme Court rec-
ognized that in a breach of warranty action a manufacturer should
bear losses that he is in the best position to prevent. 137 This is also
the realistic and objective tort goal of the proposed revision's pub-
lic policy rationale.
2. Design Defects
Under the proposed revision a design defect occurs when there is
a deficiency in a product line that is made exactly as the manufac-
turer intended. 38
a. The Proposed Revision
The proposed revision adopts a risk/utility balancing test to de-
termine liability in defective design cases.' 39 One element to be
balanced is the availability, at the time of marketing, of an alterna-
tive, safer design, given the foreseeable risk of harm. The court
must also balance the reasonableness and cost of adopting such an
alternative safer design. 40
A corollary to this risk/utility test is that liability does not at-
tach to inherently dangerous categories of products where no safer
design alternatives exist that would accomplish the utilitarian pur-
pose of such products.' For example, as long as sufficient warn-
ings accompany prescription drugs marketing, the risk/utility bal-
ancing test for defective design will not apply. 42 The proposed
revision specifically rejects the consumer expectation test for de-
sign defect liability. 43
b. Existing Virginia Law
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit con-
struing Virginia law, has set out a similar risk/utility balancing test
136. 206 Va. 457, 143 S.E.2d 897 (1965) (implied warranty case).
137. Id. at 460, 143 S.E.2d at 900.
138. SPAHN & DaM, supra note 9, at 18.
139. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 38 at 1514; id. at 1520 cmt. h.
140. See id. at 1514 (§ 402A(2)(b)).
141. Id. at 1520-21 cmt. i.
142. Id. at 1522-23 cmt. k.
143. Id. at 1520 cmt. h.
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for design defect liability.14 4 Factors to be considered are the likeli-
hood of harm caused by the design, the gravity of such harm, and
the burden of effective precautions. Specifically, if the cost to rede-
sign a safer product is low, the manufacturer has a duty to do so. 4 '
The Supreme Court of Virginia has neither expressly adopted
nor rejected such a risk/utility test in defective design cases. 146
However, it recognizes that a product must be designed so as not
to be unreasonably dangerous for its intended use, or for a reason-
ably foreseeable use. 147 The supreme court has utilized such factors
as the comparison of a product's design with industry standards148
and expert opinion as to a product design's safety.149
The supreme court has noted various factors that are common in
risk/utility balancing. For example, in Turner v. Manning, Max-
well & Moore, Inc.,50 the court noted the availability of safety de-
vices costing one dollar and sixty cents each as optional equipment
on suspension device. 5 1 However, the court decided the case on
the ground that the plaintiff had misused the hoist.6 2
c. Comparison of Virginia Law and the Proposed Revision
The proposed revision adopts a risk/utility balancing test for de-
sign defect liability in accordance with most other American juris-
dictions.153 Although the Supreme Court of Virginia has not ex-
pressly adopted this test, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, construing Virginia law, has already done so. Moreover, ex-
isting Virginia law does not conflict with the proposed revision rec-
ommendation to analyze defective design product liability by
144. Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1071 (4th Cir. 1974); see also
Lust v. Clark Equip. Co., 792 F.2d 436 (4th Cir. 1986).
145. Bly v. Otis Elevator Co., 713 F.2d 1040, 1043 (4th Cir. 1983); Dreisonstok, 489 F.2d.
at 1073.
146. See generally SPAHN & DRAIM, supra note 9, at 29.
147. The Virginia Supreme Court uses the language of the two-pronged Logan test to
frame the test for defective design liability. See Featherall v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
219 Va. 949, 963-64, 252 S.E.2d 358, 367 (1979) (quoting Logan v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
216 Va. 425, 428, 219 S.E.2d 685, 687 (1975)).
148. See R.B. Hazard, Inc. v. Panco, 240 Va. 438, 443, 397 S.E.2d 866, 869 (1990); Turner
v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 216 Va. 245, 251, 217 S.E.2d 863, 868 (1975).
149. See Ford Motor Co. v. Bartholomew, 224 Va. 421, 429-30, 297 S.E.2d 675, 678-80
(1982); Turner, 216 Va. at 250, 217 S.E.2d at 867-68.
150. 216 Va. 245, 217 S.E.2d 863 (1975).
151. Id. at 248, 217 S.E.2d at 866-67.
152. Id. at 252, 217 S.E.2d at 869.
153. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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utilizing a risk/utility balancing test. Indeed, the proposed revision
risk/utility foreseeability test for defective design cases is similar
to the negligence test for defective design that Virginia already
recognizes. T5
3. Warning Defects
Products with hidden or latent dangers may be defective if no
warning of such dangers is given to the consumer by the manufac-
turer.155 Therefore, actions maintained on the theory that a seller
failed to give an adequate product warning to the consumer consti-
tute a third type of product defect. 156
a. The Proposed Revision
The proposed revision advocates a standard of liability for warn-
ing defects that again relies on a risk/utility balancing test.
1 57
Product instructions or warnings need to be reasonable, but are
required only for non-obvious dangers.158 Like Virginia defective
design cases, the proposed revision holds the seller to a foreseeabil-
ity standard regarding knowledge of the product's dangers. If the
seller knew, or should have known, of the product's latent dangers,
and failed to warn or instruct the consumer, then the seller is sub-
ject to liability.1 59 The time at which the seller's knowledge is at
issue is normally at the time of sale. However, post-sale duties to
warn may also arise.1 0
While the seller need not warn of obvious risks of danger, when
risks cannot be eliminated, as with inherently dangerous products,
154. See, e.g., Jhisss A. HENDERSON, JR & AARON D. TwERs i, Stargazing: The Future of
American Products Liability Law, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1332, 1334 (1991) ("Risk-utility, with-
out doubt, will emerge victorious as the liability standard in generic [design] defect cases.
And we might as well acknowledge that once risk-utility becomes the operative theory in
generic litigation, negligence will reign supreme."); see also Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 365
N.W.2d 176, 186 (Mich. 1984) ("We adopt, forthrightly, a pure negligence risk-utility test in
products liability actions against manufacturers of products, where liability is predicated
upon defective design").
155. STEVENSON, supra note 40, at 25.
156. See SPAHN & DRAIM, supra note 9, at 53.
157. Proposed Revision supra note 38, at 1515-16 cmt. b.
158. Id. at 1514 (§ 402A (2)(c)).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1521-22 cmt. j.
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the seller is required to warn in order that users may make in-
formed decisions regarding the product's use. 161
b. Existing Virginia Law
The Supreme Court of Virginia has expressly adopted Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts Section 388 as its standard for liability in
defective warning cases. 16 2 Under this standard, the seller's duty to
warn is triggered if he knows, or should know, of a risk of danger.
A seller also has a duty to warn if he should foresee that users
might misuse a product with its attendant unknown risks.6'6 For
example, in Featherall v Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 64 the Su-
preme Court of Virginia held that a pressure regulator manufac-
turer should have recognized the possibility that users would take
off an easily removable locknut.6 5 Because the manufacturer un-
derstood the danger in removing the locknut and users were un-
likely to recognize that danger, the manufacturer had a duty to
warn. 1
6
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in Spruill v. Boyle-
Midway, Inc., 67 established a two-part test to determine what con-
stitutes an adequate warning. A warning must be in a conspicuous
form so as to catch the attention of the user and the warning must
convey the nature and extent of the danger. 68 Spruill may have
161. Id.
162. See Featherall v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 219 Va. 949, 962, 252 S.E.2d 358, 366
(1979) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965)).
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use is
subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with
the consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm
caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose
use it is supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for
the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will
realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of
the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965).
163. See Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 83-84 (4th Cir. 1962); Featherall, 219
Va. at 966, 252 S.E.2d at 369.
164. 219 Va. 949, 252 S.E.2d 358 (1979).
165. Id. at 966, 252 S.E.2d at 369.
166. Id.
167. 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962).
168. Id. at 85.
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been limited to inherently dangerous products .169 However, in a
case where a statute required a warning on fungicide, the supreme
court stated that warnings or instructions must do more than ex-
plain how to use the product, describing the danger adequately
enough to promote safe use.17
Under presently existing Virginia warranty law, it is not neces-
sary to warn of obvious dangers.17 1 However, Virginia negligence
law also recognizes an "open and obvious danger" exception to this
rule. 1 2 Moreover, assumption of the risk is a valid defense in both
warranty and negligence actions.7 3 Because the elements of an as-
sumption of the risk defense are proof that plaintiff fully appreci-
ated and voluntarily incurred the danger, one reasonably assumes
that an opportunity for the defense is available when the danger is
open and obvious.
In Virginia a manufacturer has a duty to warn the ultimate con-
sumer as well as the immediate buyer in those circumstances dic-
tated by comment n of the Restatement (Second) of Torts section
388.174 In 1990, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit noted six factors to be balanced in ascertaining liability for
failure to warn: (1) the dangerous condition of the product, (2) the
purpose for which the product is used, (3) the form of the warning
actually given, (4) the reliability of the party warned as to whether
he will warn others, (5) the magnitude of the risk involved, and (6)
the extent of the burden placed on a manufacturer by forcing him
to warn the ultimate user directly.17 5 In the case of prescription
169. See Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973) (absolving a manufacturer
of liability in an employee injury, where the manufacturer could expect the employer/buyer
to understand the nature of the risk).
170. McClanahan v. California Spray-Chemical Corp., 194 Va. 842, 75 S.E.2d 712 (1953).
171. See Brockett v. Harrell Bros., Inc., 206 Va. 457, 463, 143 S.E.2d 897, 902 (1965) ("[lIf
the condition ... of which the plaintiff complains was known, visible or obvious to her,
there was no liability on an implied warranty of fitness.").
172. See Artrip v. E.E. Berry Equip. Co., 240 Va. 354, 397 S.E.2d 821 (1990); Clark v.
Chapman, 238 Va. 655, 385 S.E.2d 885 (1989); Runyon v. Geldner, 237 Va. 460, 377 S.E.2d
456 (1989); Tate v. Rice, 227 Va. 341, 315 S.E.2d 385 (1984).
173. See Lust v. Clark Equip. Co., 792 F.2d 436 (4th Cir. 1986) (construing assumption of
the risk as a defense to warranty actions). But see White Consol. Indus. v. Swiney, 237 Va.
23, 29, 376 S.E.2d 283, 286 (1989) (refusing to decide whether assumption of the risk is a
valid defense to a warranty action).
174. Jones v. Meat Packers Equip. Co., 723 F.2d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 1983).
175. Willis v. Raymark Indus., 905 F.2d, 793, 796-97 (4th Cir. 1990), citing Oman v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 764 F.2d 224, 233 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 970 (1985).
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medicine, the manufacturer has a duty to warn prescribing physi-
cians of risks under the learned intermediary doctrine." 6
c. Comparison of Virginia Law and the Proposed Revision
The proposed revision requirement of reasonable instructions or
warnings for non-obvious, foreseeable dangers agrees with Virginia
law. The proposed revision and current Virginia law both trigger a
duty to warn when the seller knows, or should know, of a hidden
risk. Neither the proposed revision nor current Virginia law im-
putes liability if the risk was obvious to the user. Moreover, Vir-
ginia's current standards for adequacy of a warning fit within this
reasonable warning or instruction requirement.
Likewise, in the areas of inherently dangerous products and
post-sale duty to warn, the proposed revision and current Virginia
law do not noticeably conflict. Virginia already recognizes a height-
ened liability for inherently dangerous products. 177 Although the
supreme court has not directly considered a post-sale duty to warn,
it has mentioned that such a duty might arise.178
E. Causation
Traditional causation analysis involves two elements. First, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant factually caused a harm;
"but for" the product defect the injury would not have occurred.
Secondly, the plaintiff must show that the defendant should legally
be held liable for that harm, largely as a matter of policy. 7 9 These
two causation elements are considered as cause-in-fact and proxi-
mate cause respectively.180 However, the proposed revision treats
both elements as a part of general proximate causation."8
176. See Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1115 (4th Cir.) cert. denied,
488 U.S. 908 (1988); see also Pfizer, Inc. v. Jones, 221 Va. 681, 684, 272 S.E.2d 43, 44 (1980).
177. Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 83 (4th Cir. 1962); McClanahan v. Cali-
fornia Spray-Chem. Corp., 194 Va. 842, 852, 75 S.E.2d 712, 718 (1953).
178. Turner v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 216 Va. 245, 252, 217 S.E.2d 863, 869
(1975).
179. STEVENSON, supra note 40, at 33.
180. SPAHN & DRAIM, supra note 9, at 108.
181. Proposed Revision, supra note 38, at 1523 cmt. 1.
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1. The Proposed Revision
The black-letter portion of the proposed revision imposes liabil-
ity for harm "proximately caused by the product defect. 18 2 The
accompanying commentary explains that there cannot be liability
without proximate cause and recommends that the plaintiff con-
tinue to have the burden of proof on this issue.183 Recognizing that
causation terminology differs from state to state, the commentary
defines proximate cause as embracing all of the traditional causa-
tion issues including defendant identification, cause-in-fact, inter-
vening cause, superseding cause, substantial factor, and traditional
184proximate cause.
On the issue of defendant identification, the proposed revision
commentary recognizes that alternative liability case law is devel-
oping where traditional fault-based liability may be inadequate."8 5
The commentary recommends a traditional causation analysis
whenever possible, but also recommends alternative liability in
"unusual cases." 188
Comment o of the Proposed Revision specifically addresses in-
tervening causes. Here, third party product misuse or alteration of
the product is to be analyzed as part of the foreseeability element
of proximate cause. The commentary also considers product mis-
use or alteration as part of the comparative fault analysis, but fur-
ther notes that plaintiffs conduct can be so egregious as to become
an intervening, superceding cause.ls7
Proximate causation in the proposed revision requires proof of
four elements: (1) but for the product, there would have been no
injury, (2) the defendant commercially distributed the product, (3)
but for the product's defective condition such as a manufacturing
defect, choice of an inadequately unsafe design, or failure to warn
of a danger, the harm would not exist, and (4) the harm was rea-
sonably foreseeable when the defendant sold the product.18
182. Id. at 1514.
183. Id. at 1523 cmt. 1.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1518 cmt. e. (giving the DES cases as an example of what is meant by alterna-
tive liability, thus possibly including market share liability, enterprise liability, and "concert
in action" liability analyses).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1525 cmt. o.
188. Id. at 1523 cmt. 1.
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2. Existing Virginia Law
The Supreme Court of Virginia defines proximate cause as "that
act or omission which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbro-
ken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the event, and
without which that event would not have occurred."'189 This defini-
tion includes cause-in-fact as an element of proof. 90
The supreme court has made an issue of cause-in-fact, or "but
for" causality, in cases involving each of the three categories of
product defectiveness. In design defect cases, the plaintiff must
show that his or her injury would not have happened without the
defendant's choice of an inferior product design.' 9' In warning de-
fect cases, the plaintiff must show that the injury could have been
avoided had there been a proper warning. 92 Because of the negli-
gence standard used in manufacturing defect cases in Virginia,
there are two "but for" causation issues. The plaintiff must show
that the defendant's negligence caused the defect 9 3 and that the
defect caused his or her injury.9 4
Under Virginia warranty law, the plaintiff bears the same cause-
in-fact burden in design and warning defects cases as in negligence
actions. In the case of a manufacturing defect, however, the plain-
tiff need only show that, but for the defect, he or she would not
have been injured.19 5
189. Banks v. City of Richmond, 232 Va. 130, 135, 348 S.E.2d 280, 282 (1986) (quoting
Coleman v. Blankenship Oil Corp., 221 Va. 124, 131, 267 S.E.2d 143, 147 (1980) (quoting
Beale v. Jones, 210 Va. 519, 522, 171 S.E.2d 851, 853 (1970)).
190. See Turner v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 216 Va. 245, 250-51, 217 S.E.2d 863,
868 (1975) (finding that if a hook holding a hoist had not been open throated, an accident
might not have happened); Scott v. Simms, 188 Va. 808, 817-18, 51 S.E.2d 250, 253-54
(1949) (stating that whether a negligently parked car proximately caused a pedestrian death
in the course of an automobile collision was a question for the jury).
191. See Ford Motor Co. v. Bartholomew, 224 Va. 421, 432, 297 S.E.2d 675, 680 (1992)
(finding that a faulty transmission design "enhanced danger of misuse").
192. See Featherall v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 219 Va. 949, 965-66, 252 S.E.2d 358,
369 (1979) (finding that a warning of the danger of removing a locknut could have prevented
the injury).
193. See, e.g., Southern States Co-Op., Inc. v. Doggett, 223 Va. 650, 292 S.E.2d 331 (1982)
(plaintiff carried the burden of proof by a chain of circumstantial evidence showing that
defendant had sold cattle feed with poison in it).
194. See, e.g., Middlesboro Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Campbell, 179 Va. 693, 20 S.E.2d
479 (1942) (plaintiff showed that the defective Coca-Cola caused his injury by the fact that
three people ate exactly the same food he did, but he alone drank Coca-Cola).
195. Compare White Consol. Indus. v. Swiney, 237 Va. 23, 376 S.E.2d 283 (1989) (confus-
ing warranty and negligence principles to arrive at the conclusion that the defect probably
did cause a fire) with Logan v Montgomery Ward & Co., 216 Va. 425, 219 S.E.2d 685 (1975)
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However, even a plaintiff's conclusive showing of "but for" cau-
sality is not enough to establish liability without proof of proxi-
mate cause. 98 A finding of proximate cause in Virginia is based
upon "mixed considerations of logic, common sense, justice, policy,
and precedent.' 19 7
In at least one case, the supreme court advocated assigning lia-
bility to the party in the best position to prevent the injury. 98
However, the usual consideration is whether the injury was fore-
seeable given the defect. 99 Under the negligence standard, proof of
foreseeability of the precise occurrence is not required. Only proof
that some injury would probably occur is required. 00 Under war-
ranty theory, Virginia courts phrase the issue in terms of whether
the use, or an intervening misuse, was foreseeable or unforeseeable.
The courts assign liability where the'use or misuse, and thus the
injury, was foreseeable.20'
Virginia courts apply a misuse analysis in warranty cases to de-
termine whether plaintiff's behavior is an intervening, superseding
cause. In negligence cases, the courts consider a plaintiff's behavior
under a contributory negligence analysis.
An intervening cause analysis addresses third party acts, which
may have superseded the defendant's behavior, or the product de-
fect, in causing the injury. Where a third party action supersedes,
the defect is not the proximate cause of the injury.202 Usually, if
the defendant should have foreseen the possibility of the third
party intervening act, that act does not supersede.0 3 On the other
(refusing to allow the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to establish a cause-in-fact without evi-
dence that the product was under the exclusive control of the defendant in a stove fire case).
196. Banks v. City of Richmond, 232 Va. 130, 135, 348 S.E.2d 280, 283 (1986).
197. Scott v. Simms, 188 Va. 808, 816, 51 S.E.2d 250, 253 (1949).
198. Brockett v. Harrell Bros., Inc., 206 Va. 457, 460, 143 S.E.2d 897, 900 (1965).
199. See R.B. Hazard, Inc. v. Panco, 240 Va. 438, 444, 397 S.E.2d 866, 869 (1990) (stating
that righting and re-use of a broken, defective gate is foreseeable); White Consol. Indus. v.
Swiney, 237 Va. 23, 29, 376 S.E.2d 283, 286 (1989) (finding that plaintiffs failure to unplug a
stove because the clock and some of the controls had malfunctioned was foreseeable).
200. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Winesett, 225 Va. 459, 468, 303 S.E.2d 868, 874 (1983).
201. See, e.g., Swiney, 237 Va. at 29, 376 S.E.2d at 286 (foreseeable misuse does not bar a
claim of reliance or warranty).
202. See Banks v. City of Richmond, 232 Va. 130, 136, 348 S.E.2d 280, 283 (1986) (hold-
ing the city's assumed negligence did not proximately cause a fire where an apartment main-
tenance man struck a match while looking for a gas leak).
203. See R.B. Hazard, Inc. 240 Va. at 444, 397 S.E.2d at 869 (finding that the fixing of a
fallen, broken gate was foreseeable by the negligent constructor of the gate, and that fixing
the gate was therefore not a superseding cause); Scott v. Simms, 188 Va. 808, 818-19, 51
S.E.2d 250, 254 (1949) (finding that an automobile collision, which caused the death of a
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hand, unforeseeable third party actions will normally constitute a
superseding cause.20
4
3. Comparison of Virginia Law and the Proposed Revision
Virginia law and the proposed revision both require proof of
"but for" causation, as well as proximate causation, before impos-
ing liability. "But for" causation follows the same analysis under
both Virginia law and the proposed revision, except in manufactur-
ing defect cases. In manufacturing defect cases, because of Vir-
ginia's negligence law, an additional element of proof that the
manufacturer's negligence caused the defect is required. However,
a plaintiff can avoid this legal hurdle in Virginia by proceeding
under a warranty action, which, like the proposed revision, does
not require this additional causation element.
Traditional proximate cause analysis is based upon a foreseeabil-
ity test under Virginia law as well as the proposed revision. Under
both theories, intervening causes will supersede the product defect
as the proximate cause of the injury only if such causes were
unforeseeable. 05
F. Contributory or Comparative Fault
The behavior of the consumer-plaintiff with regard to a defective
product also plays an important role in determining whether or not
a court will impose liability on the seller or manufacturer. If the
plaintiff's behavior to some extent caused the injury, a small mi-
nority of states will absolve the defendant from all liability. How-
ever, the overwhelming majority of other jurisdictions will dis-
tribute the liability between the plaintiff and the defendant
proportionally.2 6 Traditionally, plaintiff misconduct falls into one
pedestrian child who was forced to stand in the street because of an improperly parked car,
did not as a matter of law supersede the negligent parking as a proximate cause of the
child's death, because a jury could find the injury was foreseeable given the negligent
parking).
204. See Turner v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 216 Va. 245, 250, 217 S.E.2d 863,
868 (1975) (holding that unforeseeable misuse of a hoist caused the plaintiff injury, not the
open-throated design of the hook from which the hoist was suspended).
205. But see the discussion on comparative fault, infra notes 206-38 and accompanying
text.
206. Forty-five states recognize comparative fault. Only Alabama, Maryland, North Caro-
lina, South Carolina, and Virginia have not enacted some form of comparative fault. See
generally HENRY WOODS, CoMPARATIvE FAULT § 1:11 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1992).
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of three affirmative defenses: contributory or comparative fault,
unforeseeable product misuse,07 and assumption of the risk.20
1. The Proposed Revision
The black letter portion of the proposed revision makes no ex-
press mention of plaintiff misconduct. The seller is liable for inju-
ries proximately caused by product defects.20 9
However, comment n of the proposed revision recognizes the dis-
parity among states in the treatment of plaintiff misconduct as a
factor in assigning liability. According to comment n, the proposed
revision takes no position as to whether fault on the part of the
plaintiff should mitigate the seller's liability or provide an affirma-
tive defense; nor does the proposed revision address whether as-
sumption of the risk should bar defendant's liability. The proposed
revision leaves these issues for the developing case and statutory
law of the various states.210
Comment n notes, however, that a vast majority of states cur-
rently reduce recovery based upon the plaintiff's comparative fault.
The choice the comment offers in manufacturing defect cases is
between offering no reduction in damages regardless of the plain-
tiff's fault, and offering some proportional reduction under com-
parative fault principles.211
Regarding design and warning defects, the commentary implies
that, since an analysis of whether or not there is a defect hinges on
the foreseeability of the plaintiff's conduct, there may be no need
207. Unforeseeable product misuse is an affirmative defense in some jurisdictions. See,
e.g., Perfection Paint Co. v. Konduris, 258 N.E.2d 681 (Ind. App. 1970). However, unforesee-
able product misuse can also negate a claim of product defectiveness or proximate cause.
See, e.g., Rogers v. Toro Mfg. Co., 522 S.W.2d 632 (Mo. App. 1975). The plaintiff, therefore,
would have the burden of proof in product misuse issues involving defectiveness and causa-
tion, and the defendant would have the burden of proof in product misuse issues as affirma-
tive defenses.
208. The assumption of risk defense has been abolished in a majority of states. Other
states have merged the defense into the state's comparative fault laws. See CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-572h(c) (West 1991); Wilson v. Gordon, 354 A.2d 398, 401-02 (Me. 1976); Wentz
v. Deserth, 221 N.W.2d 101, 104-05 (N.D. 1974).
Other states, however, continue to deny all recovery in products liability cases based upon
the assumption of risk defense. See Andren v. White-Rodgers Co., 465 N.W.2d 102, 105
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964, 967 (N.Y. 1986); see generally
WooDs, supra note 206, § 6:1-6:9.
209. Proposed Revision, supra note 38, at 1514 (§ 402A(1)).
210. Id. at 1525 cmt. n.
211. See id.
1993]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
to further consider the plaintiff's comparative faulty.12 The com-
mentary does note, however, that totally ignoring the plaintiff's
conduct "runs against the grain of common sense,"21 and that the
plaintiff's conduct may be "so egregious that it works as an inter-
vening cause, cutting off defendant's liability altogether." 4
2. Existing Virginia Law
In Virginia, there are presently three products liability defenses
based on the plaintiff's conduct: contributory negligence; unfore-
seeable product misuse; and assumption of the risk. A plaintiff's
contributory negligence is a complete bar to recovery in a negli-
gence action, 21. but does not effect recovery in a warranty action. 16
Unforeseeable plaintiff misuse of the product will also bar recovery
in a negligence or warranty action. 217 Apparently the assumption of
the risk defense also applies to both negligence and warranty ac-
tions in Virginia.21 8
a. Contributory Negligence Under Virginia Law
In Virginia, a plaintiff is barred from recovery in a negligence
action where his own negligence proximately contributes to the in-
jury.21 9 Whether the plaintiff's negligence rises to the level of prox-
imately contributing to the injury can be a matter of law decided
by the judge.2 Where reasonable minds could differ, however, the
issue goes to the jury with the other issues in the case.221
212. See id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1525-26 cmt. o (discussing unforeseeable product misuse, alteration, and
modification).
215. Jones v. Meat Packers Equip. Co., 723 F.2d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 1983).
216. See Brockett v. Harrell Bros., 206 Va. 457, 463, 143 S.E.2d 897, 902 (1965).
217. See White Consol. Indus. v. Swiney, 237 Va. 23, 29, 376 S.E.2d 283, 286 (1989).
218. Lust v. Clark Equip. Co., 792 F.2d 436, 439 (4th Cir. 1986). But cf. White Consol.
Indus., 237 Va. at 29, 376 S.E.2d at 286-87 (1989) (refusing to decide whether assumption of
the risk is a defense to a warranty action).
219. Ford Motor Co. v. Bartholomew, 224 Va. 421, 432, 297 S.E.2d 675, 680-81 (1982).
220. See Bly v. Otis Elevator Co., 713 F.2d 1040, 1042 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating that the
lower court had held that the conduct of a lift truck driver, who drove in reverse without
looking behind him, barred recovery as a matter of law).
221. See Antrip v. E.E. Berry Equip. Co., 240 Va. 354, 397 S.E.2d 821 (1990) (plaintiff
injured while crossing a snow bank created by defendant's clearing a parking lot); Virginia
Elec. & Power Co. v. Winesett, 225 Va. 459, 303 S.E.2d 868 (1983) (plaintiff's decedent was
electrocuted while trimming a tree when a branch struck a naked high voltage wire);
Featherall v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 219 Va. 949, 252 S.E.2d 358 (1979) (remanding
the issue of contributory negligence for jury consideration).
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In design defect and warning defect cases, an analysis of the
plaintiff's conduct is separate from a determination of whether or
not the product is defective. For example, in Featherall v. Fire-
stone Tire & Rubber Co., the Supreme Court of Virginia deter-
mined that, although the manufacturer had failed to warn, the jury
could nevertheless find that the conduct of the plaintiff constituted
contributory negligence.222 In Ford Motor Co. v. Bartholomew, the
court concluded that the design of a car transmission could have
been found defective. However, the court also considered the
plaintiff's conduct in failing to take steps to assure herself that the
transmission was in "park.1223
As to manufacturing defect cases, Virginia courts usually analyze
them according to warranty theories.224 Nevertheless, under a neg-
ligence theory, contributory negligence could also bar recovery. 225
b. Product Misuse Under Virginia Law
Because contributory negligence is not a defense to a breach of
warranty cause of action, defendants will often argue that the
plaintiff's misuse of the product is a defense against any breach of
implied warranty claim. 226 Defendants utilize this defense in two
ways. First, foreseeability of harm is an element of the prima facie
design or warning defect case, and defendants may therefore argue
that the plaintiff has not sustained his burden of proof on this ele-
ment.227 Second, the defendant may attempt to argue that product
misuse bars a plaintiff's claim of reliance on the warranty.22 The
defense that the plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proof on
foreseeability of harm is by far the most commonly used defense.
222. Featherall, 219 Va. at 967, 252 S.E.2d at 370.
223. Ford Motor Co. v. Bartholomew, 224 Va. 421, 431-33, 297 S.E.2d 675, 680-81 (1982).
224. See generally SPAHN & DRAim, supra note 9, at 48-49.
225. See White Consol. Indus. v. Swiney, 237 Va. 23, 29-30, 376 S.E.2d 283, 286-87 (1989)
(discussing product misuse and assumption of the risk with regard to a defect in a stove,
contributory negligence, and the case as being decided under a warranty theory).
226. See, e.g., Turner v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 216 Va. 245, 217 S.E.2d 863
(1975) (plaintiff's misuse of a hoist was held to excuse a duty to warn, and to supersede a
design defect as the cause of the injury).
227. See, e.g., Featherall v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 219 Va. 949, 962, 252 S.E.2d
358, 366-67 (1979) (holding there was no failure to warn of the danger of using a Cornelius
brand lid with a Firestone brand tank because the use of these products as a cleaning ma-
chine constituted unforeseeable product misuse).
228. See Swiney, 237 Va. at 29, 376 S.E.2d at 286 (discussing the use of a product with a
known defect as product misuse barring a claim of reliance, but finding against the defend-
ant on the facts).
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However, some commentators state that unforeseeable product
misuse is not a "true" affirmative defense, as the burden of proof
remains with the plaintiff rather than the defendant.2
From the defendant's standpoint, placing the burden of proof on
the plaintiff does not obviate the necessity for the defendant to
raise this product misuse issue whenever possible. However, re-
gardless of whether product misuse is characterized as a defective-
ness issue, a proximate cause issue, or an affirmative defense issue
it is an important obstacle that the plaintiff must overcome.
c. Assumption of the Risk Under Virginia Law
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, pur-
portedly applying Virginia law, has held that assumption of the
risk is a valid defense in Virginia to breach of warranty actions.230
The Supreme Court of Virginia has not decided that issue, but it
has held that assumption of the risk is a valid defense in a negli-
gence action.231
Plaintiff conduct that constitutes an assumption of the risk de-
fense differs from conduct which constitutes contributory negli-
gence conduct. Virginia courts analyze carelessness as contributory
negligence under a reasonably prudent person standard and ven-
turousness as assumption of the risk under a subjective
standard. 32
Thus, there are two elements necessary to prove assumption of
the risk. First, the plaintiff must have understood the nature and
extent of the risk. Second, the plaintiff must have voluntarily in-
curred that risk.233 The defendant can assert assumption of the
risk in a manufacturing defect case. It is not enough, however, that
the plaintiff knows that the product is defective. He must also un-
derstand the danger involved in using the product in its defective
state.3 4
229. SPAHN & DRAIM, supra note 9, at 124. See also supra note 207 and accompanying
text.
230. Lust v. Clark Equip. Co., 792 F.2d 436, 439-40 (4th Cir. 1986).
231. Id. at 440; see Swiney, 237 Va. at 29-30, 376 S.E.2d at 286.
232. Amusement Slides Corp. v. Lehmann, 217 Va. 815, 818-19, 232 S.E.2d 803, 805
(1977).
233. Id.
234. See Swiney, 237 Va. at 30, 376 S.E.2d at 206 (disallowing the defense that plaintiff
knew that a switch and the clock of a stove were broken, because plaintiff could not have
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In defective warning case, a showing by the plaintiff that the de-
fendant breached a duty to warn is tantamount to proving that
plaintiff did not know of the risk. Thus a prima facie warning de-
fect case often renders an assumption of the risk defense impossi-
ble.25 5 Assumption of the risk does not appear to have been used as
a defense in any Virginia defective design case. However, it may be
an indirect factor in the court of appeal's risk/utility balancing
test.23
3. Comparison of Virginia Law and the Proposed Revision
The proposed revision would change Virginia products liability
negligence law into a modified strict liability in tort law. Therefore,
a contributory negligence defense has no place under the proposed
revision, just as contributory negligence is not a defense to a
breach of warranty action. However, the behavior or conduct of the
consumer-plaintiff with regard to a defective product still plays an
important role in determining whether or not a court will impose
liability on the product manufacturer or seller.
The proposed revision takes no position as to whether or not a
comparative fault defense should be adopted, and leaves that issue
to developing state law. As drafted below, the proposed Virginia
Products Liability Act would adopt a "modified" comparative fault
statute for products liability actions, and bring Virginia into a
modern consensus with forty-five other states that have already
enacted some form of comparative fault law.237
Unforeseeable product misuse and assumption of risk are de-
fenses that currently exist under present Virginia law, and would
continue to exist under the proposed Virginia Products Liability
Act.238
known that these defects made the stove a fire hazard even when not in use (quoting
Amusement Slides v. Lehman, 217 Va. 815, 819, 232 S.E.2d 803, 805 (1977))).
235. See McClanahan v. California Spray-Chem. Corp., 194 Va. 842, 864, 75 S.E.2d 712,
725 (1953) (stating that there could not be assumption of the risk because the plaintiff had
not been warned of the risk).
236. See Dreisonstok v. Volkwagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1071-73 (4th Cir. 1974).
237. See, e.g., WOODS, supra note 206, § 1:11.
238. See infra art. III, Proposed Virginia Products Liability Legislation.
1993]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
G. Conclusion
The proposed revision provides thoughtful, experienced, and ob-
jective new legislation which imposes strict liability in tort for
manufacturing defects, and a risk/utility foreseeability test for de-
sign and warning defects. Each of these three categories of product
defectiveness is presently recognized as grounds for recovery under
Virginia's negligence and breach of warranty law. However, serious
legal flaws in negligence and warranty actions exist in Virginia
products liability law. Important countervailing public policy con-
siderations now mandate that Virginia products liability law join a
more modern, balanced, and objective consensus. The proposed re-
vision, which is incorporated into the Virginia Products Liability
Act, is the proper vehicle for this much needed change.
VI. PROPOSED VIRGINIA PRODUCTS LIABILITY LEGISLATION
Although many states have adopted a strict liability in tort ac-
tion by judicial enactment, it is more appropriate in Virginia to
adopt any new law in derogation of the common law by legislative
enactment from the Virginia General Assembly.239 Accordingly, the
author respectfully proposes the following new Virginia products
liablity legislation:
THE VIRGINIA PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT
Article I: Purpose
The purpose of the Virginia Products Liability Act is to create a
new strict liability in tort action in Virginia products liability law.
However, this Act is not intended to limit or change existing Vir-
ginia law in negligence, tortious misrepresentation, or breach of
warranty actions.
Comment: The purpose of the Virginia Products Liability Act is
to create a new strict liability in tort action in Virginia products
liability law, which currently exists in the overwhelming majority
239. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 1-10 (Repl. Vol. 1987) ("The common law of England,
insofar as it is not repugnant to the principles of the Bill of Rights and Constitution of this
Commonwealth, shall continue in full force within the same, and be the rule of decision,
except as altered by the General Assembly"). In addition, at least 38 other states have re-
cently enacted products liability tort reform by legislative statute. See supra note 30 and
accompanying text.
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of other American states, and thus bring Virginia into the modern
consensus of American products liability law. However, traditional
tort and warranty actions in Virginia may still be pled when appro-
priate. For example, negligence actions may be appropriate in situ-
ations where the defendant is not a seller of goods, or when the
negligent conduct of the defendant is reasonably ascertainable.
Tortious misrepresentation actions may be pled in cases of negli-
gent or deceitful misrepresentation, or in consumer fraud cases.
And breach of warranty actions may be appropriate for pure eco-
nomic loss. These examples are by way of illustration and not limi-
tation. Other negligence and warranty actions may also be pled
where appropriate.
Article II: Liability of a Seller of Defective Products
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition is subject
to liability for harm to persons or property proximately caused by
the product defect if the seller is engaged in the business of selling
such a product.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies in the case of a
claim based on:
(a) a manufacturing defect even though the seller exercised
all possible care in the preparation and marketing of the prod-
uct; or
(b) a design defect only if the foreseeable risks of harm
presented by the product, when and as marketed, could have
been reduced at reasonable cost by the seller's adoption of a
safer design; or
(c) a warning defect only if the seller failed to provide rea-
sonable instructions and warnings about non-obvious product-
related dangers that were known, or should have been known,
to the seller.
(3) A seller - other than a seller of foodstuffs not sold in a
sealed container - who has not designed, manufactured, tested, or
assembled the product or any of its component parts, shall not be
liable under this Section unless the product-related dangers were
known, or should have been known, to that seller.
Comment: Subsections (1) and (2) of this Provision are adopted
from James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed
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Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1514 (1992). Subsection (3) is intended to
protect most retailers and other sellers who are not product manu-
facturers from the application of strict tort liability. Some other
states have enacted similar statutes protecting retailers and other
sellers from strict tort liability. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-
402(1) (1987). Sellers of foodstuffs, however, are held to a higher
legal standard both under the Proposed Revision comment g, and
under existing Virginia law. See, e.g., Harris-Teeter, Inc. v. Bur-
roughs, 241 Va. 1, 399 S.E.2d 801 (1991).
Article III: Seller's Affirmative Defenses
(1) The defense of contributory negligence is not recognized
under this Act. However, the comparative fault of the plaintiff
which exceeds the fault of the defendant seller or sellers shall con-
stitute an absolute bar to the plaintiff's recovery.
(2) Plaintiff's voluntary and unreasonable assumption of a
known risk shall also constitute an absolute bar to the plaintiff's
recovery.
(3) Plaintiff's unforeseeable product misuse shall also constitute
an absolute bar to the plaintiff's recovery, as well as impacting on
issues of product defectiveness and causation.
Comment: The abolition of a contributory negligence defense
and the adoption of a "modified" comparative fault defense under
the Virginia Products Liability Act are consistent with products
liability law in forty-five other states that have adopted a "pure"
or "modified" comparative fault defense based upon plaintiff's
conduct. See, e.g., VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE§ 1.1 (2d ed. 1986), and HENRY WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT § 1:11
(2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1992). Although various states have abolished
or incorporated assumption of risk within their comparative fault
statutes, the Virginia Products Liability Act still maintains the
plaintiff's voluntary assumption of a known risk as a separate ab-
solute defense. Consistent with products liability law in all states,
including Virginia, unforeseeable product misuse may also consti-
tute an absolute defense where the defendant has the burden of
proof. In addition, unforeseeable product misuse can be a crucial
element in determining product defectiveness and proximate cau-
sation where the plaintiff has the burden of proof.
[Optional Provision: Noneconomic Damages]
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[Comment: Although the Virginia Products Liability Legislation
neither proposes nor rejects a cap on noneconomic damages, this
concept remains a very controversial area of the law that the Vir-
ginia General Assembly must address as an important public pol-
icy issue.
According to Professors Henderson and Twerski, "the modern
trend is to limit noneconomic damages in products liability ac-
tions" and several states have enacted legislative caps for
noneconomic losses. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 9.17.1(b) (1988) (cap
of $500,000 per incident for noneconomic damages); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-21-102.5(3)(a) (1987) (cap of $500,000 with clear and
convincing evidence, otherwise $250,000); see generally Scott D.
Goetsch & Dominick M. Valencia, Jr., Constitutional Challenges
to Limitations on Noneconomic Damages, 57 DEF. COUNS. J. 51, 60
(1990); see also James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski,
Stargazing: The Future of Products Liability Law, 66 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1332, 1339-1341 (1991); ("Approximately a third of the states
have enacted statutes that expressly limit recovery of noneconomic
damages, but these caps have faced a number of state and federal
constitutional challenges").
Other commentators, however, have flatly opposed and rejected
the concept of any cap on damages based upon constitutional
grounds. See James R. Andersen, Blasting the Cap: Constitutional
Issues Arising from Maryland's Limitation of Noneconomic Dam-
ages in Personal Injury Claims, 16 U. BALT. L. REV. 327 (1987);
Marco de Sae Silva, Constitutional Challenges to Washington's
Limit on Noneconomic Damages in Cases of Personal Injury and
Death, 63 WASH. L. REV. 653 (1988); But see Keri L. Ellison,
Noneconomic Damage Cap, 23 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 215 (1987); R.
Kyle Gavin, Note, The Constitutionality of Florida's Cap on
Noneconomic Damages in the Tort Reform and Insurance Act of
1986, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 157 (1987). For further analysis of the
noneconomic damages cap, see Brian R. Peacy, Comment, The
Constitutionality of Wisconsin's Noneconomic Damage Limita-
tion, 72 MARQ. L. REV. 235 (1988); Janai M. Powell, Challenging
the Constitutionality of Noneconomic Damage Caps: Boyd v. Bu-
lala and the Right to a Trial by Jury, 24 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 821
(1988).
Some caps on noneconomic damages have not withstood a con-
stitutional challenge in court. See, e.g., Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587
A.2d 1232, 1233 (N.H. 1991). But other caps on noneconomic dam-
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ages have survived a constitutional challenge in the courts. See,
e.g., Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Serv. Inc., 789 P.2d 541, 558 (Kan.
1990); Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F. Supp. 1325, 1330-32,
1336-38 (D. Md. 1989).]
V. CONCLUSION
Virginia should have adopted strict tort liability in products lia-
bility actions decades ago. The rationale for enacting such a law,
based upon interrelated social, legal, economic, and public policy
grounds, has been well demonstrated in the overwhelming majority
of American jurisdictions over the past thirty years. Today strict
liability in tort is firmly established in American products liability
law, and is firmly rooted within American jurisprudence.
The Virginia General Assembly therefore should enact realistic
and objective strict liability in tort legislation that will allow Vir-
ginia to join the broad consensus in American products liability
law. Moreover, with the Henderson-Twerski Proposed Revision of
Section 402A, Virginia can be a leader in the field of products lia-
bility tort reform.
An analogy to Virginia Domestic Relations Law is also appropri-
ate. Virginia was one of the last states to adopt an equitable distri-
bution statute2 40 dealing with the division of marital property on
divorce. However, based upon careful analysis of the experiences of
our sister states, and weighing the strengths and weaknesses of the
various state approaches, Virginia was able to draft an equitable
distribution statute that has been lauded by a national authority
as being one of the most comprehensive and best-drafted equitable
distribution statutes in the nation. 41
Now Virginia has the same opportunity to enact a model prod-
ucts liability statute based on thirty years of experience in Virginia
and in other American states. In proposing such legislation, the au-
thor is aware that reasonable people, groups, and interests, both
within and without the Virginia General Assembly, may differ re-
garding certain provisions in the proposed Virginia Products Lia-
bility Act, and that some legislative changes and fine tuning are no
240. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
241. See, e.g., LAWRENCE J. GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY (1983 & Supp.
1992) (supplement authored by Brett R. Turner).
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doubt inevitable. Nevertheless, this proposed products liability leg-
islation is a realistic and objective way to protect the legal rights
and obligations of all parties within the Commonwealth - the Vir-
ginia consumer, the Virginia manufacturer, and the Virginia re-
tailer - without consciously favoring any special interest groups.
Accordingly, I will endeavor to reach and inform all interested
parties within the Commonwealth regarding the crucial need for
this proposed legislation. I solicit your comments, suggestions, and
support.

